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Abstract
This research examines the change in police practices after the death of
Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, in 2014. Immediately after his death and
throughout the following years, police departments in St. Louis County faced
immense pressure to change. The pressure originated from numerous fronts,
including the media, local community groups, and politicians. This research
evaluates the change in policing using institutional theory with data from
surveys and interviews of police chiefs. The findings indicate changes in
policies after 2014. The most significant change occurred in departments
strongly influenced by the mimetic dimension of institutional theory. The
research adds to the literature by demonstrating the use of institutional theory to
predict organizational change.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study
Introduction
Policing in the United States has been plagued with strained
relationships in minority communities over the last 100 years. Time after time,
these strained relationships reach a tipping point where one event, sometimes
routine, sparks a wave of protest and rioting. The unrest repeatedly occurred in
the mid-1960s with the Watts Riots of 1965, The Newark and Detroit Riots of
1967, and the many episodes of turmoil following the assassination of Martin
Luther King Jr. in 1968. After the tensions reached an apex in the late 1960s,
calls for police reform spread throughout the country. As a result of these calls
for change and reform, President Lyndon Johnson created the Kerner
Commission, which authored a report suggesting many changes for policing
that were implemented to varying degrees throughout the following decades.
For all the intensity recognizing the problem with policing outlined by the
Kerner Commission, nothing near wholesale change occurred in the five
decades after the Kerner Commission. Some would argue the patterns of
police abuse continued without pause in some communities. Although the
national conversation of policing changed with at least the superficial
implementation of community policing, the policing structure in the United
States remains relatively unchanged (Brodeur 2005). Evidence of this is the
1992 riots in Los Angeles after four LAPD officers were acquitted after the
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beating of Rodney King. The King incident represented a not so uncommon
event to many South Los Angeles residents.
Many residents felt the infamous video of the King incident had occurred
many times before just without a video recording. A similar episode unfolded in
2014 with the death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. Brown was killed
by Ferguson Police Officer Darren Wilson, after being stopped while walking in
the middle of the street. Wilson confronted Brown, and the struggle that ensued
ended with Brown’s death. Protests from the death of Brown started in the
immediate community and spread throughout the United States with calls for
police reform. Perhaps even larger in scale, protests occurred in 2020 over the
death of African American man, George Floyd, by a Minneapolis, Minnesota
police officer. Like the Brown incident, an unarmed African American man was
killed at the hands of a police officer. One key difference with the Floyd incident
was that the incident was captured with a smartphone recording and several
body cameras making the event even more visceral and available for public
consumption.
Do these high-profile events and the resultant pressure to change alter
the practices of police organizations and local policing systems in the United
States? If they do change police organizations: What is the change, does it
differ among departments, and what causes change? The answers to these
questions could add to the literature on police reform, and more narrowly, the
use of institutional theory to explain the change. Given the geographic
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proximity of the over 50 police departments in the same county as the
Ferguson, Missouri Police Department, the pressure for those organizations to
change after 2014 was immense. Because of the focus from media and
stakeholders, the speculation would be that many area departments would
attempt to enact some of the reforms such as body cameras, civilian oversight,
or greater transparency. This research aims to determine two things: 1) Did the
police departments of St. Louis County enact change after 2014; and 2) Using
institutional theory, what was the mechanism of that change?
To research these questions, I used a survey instrument to gather
information on the change in police practices and through interviews with police
chiefs from St. Louis County police departments. The survey instrument asked
a series of questions about changes occurring in the years following the death
of Michael Brown in Ferguson, followed by a series of questions about
professional networks and potential external influences on the department. In
addition to the survey, I interviewed five police chiefs about their experiences
dealing with pressure to change and their decisions about current issues in
policing.
Background of Study
I worked in policing for over two decades. Starting as a patrol officer
right out of college, I have experienced the best and the worst of policing. I
have experienced helping domestic violence victims leave an abusive
relationship and worked with other officers to return a missing dementia patient
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to his family. The families in those situations never asked to be or wanted to
be in those predicaments but were grateful to have the police help put them
back on the right track. Those were unfortunate situations where I was glad to
do my part to help people who were in need of assistance. In my view, that is
policing at its best. I have also witnessed first-hand the torment that people
experience from policing. I witnessed the full range of emotions of the
community in 2014 after the death of Michael Brown. I saw rage, deep
sadness, grieving, and overwhelming despair from the community. Some in
policing are quick to dismiss those emotions as an overreaction based on
misinformation. I was struck by the raw emotion of the community. If the
experience of these community members was so directly influenced by what the
police are doing, the policing institution has an ethical obligation to examine the
practices that lead to that moment. For local police organizations to dismiss
those reactions would be to not care about their legitimacy or standing in the
community.
The consensus among reformers and many politicians coming out of
2014 was that policing needed an overhaul. Commissions such as the
President’s Task Force on 21 Century Policing, The Ferguson Commission, and
others all called for changes in the policing institution. The calls for change are
an important step in the right direction in the view of many community members
and even some members of police departments. What is overlooked though, is
how to make the change. Police departments have a reputation of being
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intractable. Many reform efforts have withered over the years as the resistance
to change mounts, and the inertia of the status quo regains traction.
With my experiences in policing as the background, I became interested
in determining the factors that contribute to reform in police departments. If the
consensus among reformers is that change is needed, the conditions making
that change possible need to be clear. The research I am conducting takes
advantage of the numerous police departments experiencing immense pressure
to change after Ferguson. With over 50 departments in St. Louis County, there
is likely to be variation in the degree to which departments implemented
change. The eight years since the events in Ferguson have given local
departments time to change and enact permanent reform. My research takes
advantage of this moment in time when the pressure and spotlight for reform
were intense and focused on a specific geographic area in the nation.
History Repeats Itself: The history of police scandal in St. Louis County
I would not be conducting this research had it not been for the encounter
between Michael Brown and Ferguson Officer Darren Wilson on August 9th,
2014. The incident released a tidal wave of emotion from the residents of
Ferguson and then later from the nation. The incident spurred numerous
investigative reports and investigations by the Department of Justice and
independent commissions. What may not be fully recognized is the vast history
of scandals that plagued the police departments of St. Louis County in the
decades before the Michael Brown incident. The killing of Brown was a single
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event following a relatively obscure past of policing in St. Louis County that has
produced several cases of malfeasance and misconduct. To be fair, most
police departments have scandals given enough officers and time as an
organization. The biggest police departments in the United States have
endured large-scale scandals over the decades. Many of them are reformed
because of the scandals and now serve as leaders in the profession. The
reason for reviewing these incidents is to provide proper context for modern
pressure and change. My argument is that the worst offenders within the
municipal departments of St. Louis County no longer exist. The institutional
pressure they faced led to their demise. Those include the now-defunct
Jennings, Kinloch, and Wellston Police Departments.
According to institutional theory, organizations are influenced
simultaneously by the institutional pressures of stakeholders and the technical
pressures of the work (J. W. Meyer and Rowan 1977). Technical pressures can
be thought of as the purely instrumental aspects of a profession. For example,
reducing crime rates for the police or increasing test scores for teachers. As
this section illustrates, many of these departments may have managed the
technical aspects of their environment, as evidenced by the overall low crime
rates in St. Louis County. Others such as Jennings, Kinloch, and Wellston
Police Departments battled high crime rates and serious legitimacy problems
with stakeholders over the years. It could be the combination of failures on the
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technical side and institutional side that result in the death of police
organizations.
I begin looking at the history of St. Louis County Police Departments with
a cursory view of the founding of the County and some of its municipalities. St.
Louis County was founded in 1812, nine years before Missouri was admitted
into the Union. The founding of the state is known for being part of what is
called the “Missouri Compromise.” The compromise allowed for slavery in
Missouri but prohibited it in all territories to the north and west of Arkansas
(Thomas 1911, 52). Many of the first settlers to the area were from Virginia,
Kentucky, and Tennessee (Thomas 1911). The St. Louis area grew in the early
to the middle part of the 1800s because of river trade and the growing rail
industry. During the Civil War, the region became a key area of the nation with
Jefferson Barracks in South St. Louis County servicing as a critical post for
Union Forces.
The great divorce, as it is commonly known, between St. Louis City and
St. Louis County occurred in 1875. The divorce refers to the split between the
two governing bodies that allowed St. Louis City to be free of county taxes while
simultaneously assuming all debt from St. Louis County and closing the borders
to further expansion. The split turned St. Louis City into a political subdivision
of a county and city (Thomas 1911; Rios 2016). What is now the modern-day
city of Clayton, Missouri, was named the county seat of St. Louis County in
1877. Some of the first cities within St. Louis County included the
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aforementioned Clayton (1877), Bridgeton (1843), Kirkwood (1853), Ferguson
(1894), Florissant (1829), Maplewood (1908), University City (1906), Wellston
(1909), and Webster Groves (1896). According to Thomas Field, most of these
cities were destinations for the rail lines in the county (Thomas 1911).
According to Rios (2016), the development of the area through the rail system
contributed to the fragmented nature of the county. The population centers
were gathered near the termination of the rail lines with cemeteries and county
clubs’ development in the vast land between the population centers and the
central city of St. Louis. Evidence of this can be seen today with the many
cemeteries and country clubs found in the county just to the west of St. Louis
City.
As the county continued developing into the 20th century, a unique
pattern of development emerged due to various factors converging. Those
factors would result in a highly fragmented local government and policing
ecosystem. The Missouri laws governing annexation heavily influenced the
development of St. Louis County. According to Goldberg (1985), Missouri
passed legislation referred to as the Sawyer Act in 1953. The Act authorized
judicial review of annexations. Before the act, cities could annex new areas by
passing an ordinance and securing the vote of a majority of residents in the
municipality desiring the annexation. For example, if the city of Kirkwood, MO
sought to annex areas adjacent to its city, it would only take a majority vote of
Kirkwood residents. With such a low barrier to annexation, it was common for
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cities of St. Louis County to annex adjoining areas found to be desirable.
Throughout the twentieth century, city after city in the county incorporated and
then annexed surrounding areas desirable in terms of either residential
population or tax revenues. The combination of ease of annexation and what
many scholars believe is the motivation to secure their cities from minorities
lead to the modern patchwork of cities containing over 90 municipalities
(Rothstein 2017; Rios 2016; Gordon 2008; 2020). Even as the patchwork was
developing, keen observers were aware of the inherent drawback to the maze
of cities surrounding St. Louis City (Hannon 1955). The development of the
County was haphazard with no central oversight for public services.
The patchwork of municipalities led to a patchwork of police
departments. As would be expected, the local policing strength followed the
maturation of local cities. As cities increased in size and population, the police
departments followed suit. Table 1. shows the number of officers in municipal
police departments in the 1960s. The information was obtained from the St.
Louis County Police Department’s historical archives.
Table 1

Municipality
(2020)
Ballwin
Bella Villa
Bellefontaine
Neighbors
Bellerive
Bel-Nor
Bel-Ridge

Officers
(~1960)
2
0

Municipality
(2020)
Fenton
Ferguson

Officers
(~1960)
0
15

Municipality (2020)
Overland
Pagedale

Officers
(~1960)
21
3

7
0
6
3

0
29
5
6

Pasadena Hills
Pasadena Park
Pine Lawn
Richmond Heights

1
1
5
17

Berkeley

16

Flordell Hills
Florissant
Frontenac
Glendale
Glen Echo
Park

0

Riverview

2

13

Beverly Hills
Black Jack
Breckenridge
Hills
Brentwood
Bridgeton
Calverton Park
Champ
Charlack
Chesterfield
Clarkson Valley
Clayton
Cool Valley
Country Club
Hills
Country Life
Acres
Crestwood

0
0

Grantwood
Village
Greendale

0
0

Rock Hill
Shrewsbury

7
4

3
13
6
0
0
0
0
0
34
2

Green Park
Hanley Hills
Hazelwood
Hillsdale
Huntleigh
Jennings
Kinloch
Kirkwood
Ladue
Lakeshire

0
0
5
0
0
18
4
38
18
0

St. Ann
St. John
Sunset Hills
Sycamore Hills
Town and Country
Twin Oaks
University City
Uplands Park
Valley Park
Velda City

4
4
0
0
0
0
50
0
2
0

0

Manchester

1

Velda Village Hills

0

0
9

23
1

Vinita Park
Warson Woods

4
3

Creve Coeur

5

0

Webster Groves

23

Crystal Lake Park
Dellwood
Des Peres

0
5
0

1
3
1

Wellston
Westwood
Wilbur Park

18
0
0

Edmundson
Ellisville
Eureka

0
0
0

Maplewood
Marlborough
Maryland
Heights
Moline
Acres
Normandy
Northwoods
Norwood
Court
Oakland
Olivette

0
0
8

Wildwood
Winchester
Woodson Terrace

0
0
2

Many of the current municipalities had no officers sixty years ago. Those
areas with no municipal policing were patrolled by the defunct St. Louis County
Sheriff’s Office. The Sheriff’s Office became the St. Louis County Police
Department in 1955 after voters decided the sheriff system for policing should
be replaced with a county police department. The impetus for the new system
of policing was an incident in 1953 where the County’s Chief Sheriff Deputy was
shot during a picnic. The investigation revealed a dispute over money and an
unhealthy environment within the Sheriff’s Office that was tied to political favors
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(Misner 1958). Like the professional movement in all levels of government at
the time, a new county police force would be formed that was apolitical and
anchored in professional standards. The formation of the St. Louis County
Police Department in 1955 represents perhaps the most significant event for
police reform in St. Louis County. The department to this day provides many
services for municipal police departments in St. Louis County.
With the municipal departments forming and developing at different
times, citizens of St. Louis County experienced varying styles and quality of law
enforcement. This is still occurring today, with some cities having accredited
departments following modern practices and others offering little more than
essential services of answering calls and conducting traffic stops. A look at the
history of the municipal departments in St. Louis County reveals that many of
the issues at the center of current reform efforts have been present for
decades. Since 1950, reports of brutality or scandal have been standard
throughout the decades. Some of the past incidents are uncannily like modern
cases of police abuse and scandal. Some of the more notable but forgotten
events are documented in the following pages. I start by describing one in
greater detail that is shockingly similar to 2014.
In 1962, the City of Kinloch, Missouri, was the center of civil unrest and
rage from the community after a Kinloch Officer shot and killed an unarmed 20year-old African American man, Donnell Dortch, while trying to serve a
summons for a traffic violation. Kinloch, a city of 6,500 in 1962, borders
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Ferguson, MO. According to newspaper reports at the time, the officer and
Dortch became involved in a physical struggle and the officer shot Dortch in the
chest twice. Dortch died from the gunshots a short time later at a hospital.
After the death of the Dortch, Kinloch residents began protesting at the Kinloch
City Hall, demanding the officer’s termination. During the next few days, the
Kinloch Police Station would be fired upon with shotguns resulting in three
officers being shot and eight buildings being burned (St. Louis Post-Dispatch
1962a; St. Louis Post-Dispatch 1962b). The St. Louis County Police
Department was called to handle the civil unrest and investigations into the
arsons. Figure 1 shows a map of the Ferguson and Kinloch for perspective on
the proximity of the 1962 incident to the 2014 incident.

16

Figure 1

A report by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch (Stradtfeld 1962) article
documented the frustration of young men in the small city after the event. The
youth of the city had little opportunity for education and jobs and believed that
the Kinloch Police Department was incompetent. Sadly, these are the same
themes expressed by the residents of Ferguson after the killing of Michael
Brown in 2014. The African American residents of Ferguson had poor housing
and few job opportunities in the area, with many nearby businesses being fast
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food or retail. In contrast, the western side of Ferguson, with a primarily white
population had been the recipient of economic development and encouraging
renewal. The similarities between the same area in St. Louis County over 50
years are striking.
The list on the pages that follow provides a summary of police abuse or
scandal incidents from St. Louis County municipalities. Area newspapers
documented these incidents at the time of the occurrence:
•

1956: A Kirkwood Police Officer was alleged to have abused two
16-year-old burglary suspects. An officer was later fired in
connection with the incident (St. Louis Globe Democrat 1956)

•

1969: An East St. Louis man alleged that four Jennings Police
Officers beat him and threatened to shoot him after being
detained as a suspect in a robbery (St. Louis Post-Dispatch
1969a)

•

1969: The Breckenridge Hills Police Department was named the
department receiving the most brutality complaints in a study done
by an intern at the St. Louis County Jail. Of the 24 complaints
received during the study, 11 originated with Breckenridge Hills
(Calkins 1969)

•

1969: The Hillsdale Police Department was alleged to have
beaten a juvenile after a traffic stop (St. Louis Post-Dispatch
1969b)
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•

1970: The former police chief of Jennings, MO, was indicted on
charges of oppression after allegedly exchanging sexual relations
with a female prisoner for lifting court costs (St. Louis PostDispatch 1970)

•

1977: The St. Louis County Police assigned officers to investigate
a series of allegations of the Maplewood Police Department
beating suspects. The investigation was motivated by the
shooting death of a mentally disabled man, Thomas Brown, inside
the Maplewood Police Department (Wagman and Freivogel
1977b). According to Freivogel ( n.d.), the officer who shot the
man pleaded guilty to manslaughter. The investigation revealed
that some Maplewood officers would play “Russian roulette” with
suspects to coerce confessions, which may have killed Brown.
Figure 2 is a photo from the St. Louis Post-Dispatch showing
Brown’s mother protesting outside the St. Louis County Police
Headquarters. The investigation into the one incident led to more
revelations about poor hiring practices and other abuses
(Wagman and Freivogel 1977a)
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Figure 2

•

1982: A community organization picketed the Berkeley Police
Department over the alleged beatings of several people in recent
months by the Jennings and St. Louis Police Departments (St.
Louis Post-Dispatch 1982)

•

1983: A man filed suit against a Pagedale officer who allegedly
severely beat the man at the police station with a blackjack (St.
Louis Post-Dispatch 1983)

•

1985: A Vinta Park Officer was accused of abusing a 14-year-old
boy by throwing him down on the pavement, twisting his arm, and
shoving his face into the ground (St. Louis Post-Dispatch 1985)
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•

1989: The NAACP raised awareness of increased complaints of
police brutality within St. Louis County. In particular, the
organization highlighted the Jennings Police Department as being
named in numerous complaints (Dine 1989)

•

1991: Community members complained that the Jennings, MO
Police Department was coercing suspects to sign over ownership
of their automobiles in exchange for being released from jail. The
St. Louis Post-Dispatch reported that one of the cars became a
daily driver for the mayor (Poor and Rose 1991)

•

1993: Approximately 60 residents from Flordell Hills and Jennings,
MO marched in front of the Jennings Police Department after a
Jennings police officer arrested a man for refusing to leave his
front yard when his son was questioned by the officer (Nower
1993a)

•

1993: Approximately 30 residents protested the Country Club Hills
Police after one of their officers stopped a 16-year-old driving a
BMW and then impounded the car under the belief that it was
stolen. The owners produced ample evidence that the vehicle
was rightfully owned, yet the police refused to return it (Nower
1993b)

•

1994: The Jennings, MO Police Department undergoes sensitivity
and cultural awareness training due to an agreement with a
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community group. The United States Department of Justice
played a role in mediating the deal that stemmed from an
allegation of brutality and a perception among residents that the
Jennings Police Department was insensitive (Kravetz 1994)
•

1995: The Missouri State Auditor found that 13 municipalities in
St. Louis County needed to improve their record-keeping and
accounting methods for fines and fees imposed by their respective
court’s (Nower 1995)

•

2000: A man arrested by the Florissant Police Department
alleged in Federal Court that a Florissant Officer beat him while
two other officers watched. Two of the officers resigned due to
the incident (Shinkle 2002)

These events of police misconduct demonstrate two things about the
municipal police departments of St. Louis County. The first is that most of these
departments can survive a scandal. The only departments no longer existing
are the Jennings Police Department, the Kinloch Police Department, and the
Uplands Park Police Department. These cities now receive policing services
from the St. Louis County Police Department. One could infer that the
respective departments were able to correct course and maintain enough
legitimacy with sovereigns to continue operating as a police department despite
the scandal. The second observation about the departments involved in the
misconduct is that the more affluent communities of St. Louis County are
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absent. The more affluent communities can pay higher salaries which should
lead to better quality officers and more funding for training. The same
communities may have community members who possess more power and
influence, leading to greater oversight of the police department. These two
observations may provide insight into why specific departments may enact
more reform after a high-profile incident such as the death of Michael Brown
and the resulting negative publicity for the region. The more affluent
communities are better positioned to make changes immediately through
funding and oversight. For example, the reform efforts of Better Together in the
region have focused on eliminating many police departments or at least
decreasing their role in law enforcement (Better Together St. Louis 2015). Part
of the reason for this is the inefficiency and lack of cooperation between
departments.
Significance of the Study
Although large segments of the American public support the police, recent
polling indicates that many minorities still hold negative views (Fingerhut 2017).
The events of 2014 in Ferguson, Missouri, and other cities across the country
brought about a renewed awareness of policing in America and the struggle for
legitimacy in minority communities. The message from the Ferguson protests
and the continued message over the last seven years is that the policing
institution in America has a legitimacy problem in minority communities. Despite
reform efforts of the past decades, the rift between minority communities and
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the police still exists today. Many of the issues highlighted in the last several
years of protest are remarkably similar, if not the same, as the problems from
the 1960s. In 2020, the nation experienced the reaction of a country after the
killing of George Floyd in Minneapolis, Minnesota. A Minneapolis officer killed
Floyd, an African American man, as several other officers stood by and
watched. The incident put a sharper point on how such tactics could be used
while other officers stood by watching. The incident seems to have brought
about more questions concerning officers’ latitude when interacting with
citizens.
Most of the research on policing (Goldstein, Sances and You 2017) has
focused on officers’ behavior with little connection to their organization. My
research could add to the literature on how police organizations change and
what facilitates or impedes that change. Rather than focusing on the individual
officers, I focus on the organization for the level of analysis. As other research
has pointed out, perhaps the role of the police department in shaping officer
behavior has been neglected (Harvey and Mungan 2019). To focus only on the
officer is to remain in the “rotten apple” paradigm, which holds that only a few or
a small number of officers cause dysfunction within organizations like a rotting
apple in a barrel spoiling the entire barrel. Thus far, the paradigm has had
limited success in producing change. Focusing on the organization and moving
out of the rotten apple paradigm could impact a greater number of communities.
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Reforming police departments is critical to maintaining organizational
legitimacy with the communities served. Without organizational legitimacy and
trust, police departments and individual officers will have a harder time fulfilling
their critical public safety missions. Without the support and cooperation of
citizens, it can be challenging for the police to know of crime in neighborhoods
and then successfully prosecute individuals without citizens coming forward
with information. For the citizens, if they lack the confidence that their police
will do what is in their best interest, they will be reluctant to use the police when
they need help. This, in turn, leads to more community and individual-based
retribution and retaliation, thereby furthering the cycles of violence in
communities.
From a theoretical/conceptual viewpoint, this research enhances the current
knowledge of the institutional theory of change for police organizations. Police
reform in the United States has been studied for more than 50 years. As
stated, most of this research focuses on individual officers. In the last twenty
years, a new wave of research on policing has examined the role of the police
organization and outcomes for communities (Makowsky and Stratmann 2009;
Matusiak 2019; Goldstein, Sances, and You 2018; Sances and You 2017;
Harvey and Mungan 2019; Daleiden 2006). The renewed focus on the
organization has been heightened, in part, because of the Department of
Justice's Report on the Ferguson Police Department (Civil Rights Division,
USDOJ 2015). The report detailed how the city of Ferguson had turned its
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police department into a revenue-generating force where officers were
encouraged by city leadership to write tickets and summonses, maintaining high
revenue levels from fines and fees. The report made it clear that the
department’s motivation was not public safety. Officers were part of a more
extensive money-making system. The report demonstrated how the
organization plays a significant role in the decisions made by individual officers
and how they use their collective discretion.
Research Paradigm
Institutional theory has its roots in sociology and views organizations as
part of the broader external environment. As part of the external environment,
organizations take cues from sovereigns or stakeholders as they are more
commonly known, to determine what changes to enact when facing uncertain or
novel situations. Using institutional theory to examine change after Ferguson
could help to solidify the use of intuitional theory to explain variation in police
organizational behavior. The rational/technical view of police departments
views them as functioning to provide public safety and reduce crime. Society
has given the police the authority to use force to deprive individual rights to
accomplish this goal. Viewed through the lens of institutional theory, the
technical/rational view of change is limited to changes that directly enhance the
ability to prosecute criminals or reduce crimes. For example, the use of
surveillance cameras or simply deploying officers to an area to make arrests.
As early writers of institutional theory asserted, at a certain point, the technical
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advancements in a field slow and all the organizations in the field become
similar in their use of the latest technology (J. W. Meyer and Rowan 1977).
Once this occurs, what matters is that organizations satisfy sovereigns that the
organization is doing what is accepted and expected of organizations in the
field.
Institutional theory has the promise to provide a theory that can explain
change and diffusion of change throughout police organizations. Institutional
theory is relevant to the issues facing the St. Louis County police departments
since the problems facing them after 2014 were not entirely technical problems
with crime control. Some would argue that crime control techniques were
overused prior to 2014 and set the stage for what unfolded in Ferguson and
throughout the nation. One could view the protests of 2014 as a backlash
against the crime control efforts of the preceding years. The Department of
Justice Report on the Ferguson Police Department highlighted the use of
enforcement-heavy tactics to address crime problems (Civil Rights Division,
USDOJ 2015) in Ferguson. Similarly, but on a larger scale, the NYPD was
criticized for the overuse of stop and frisk techniques during the same time. So
rather than technical concerns, the problems were one of standing with the
community and overall legitimacy with stakeholders. For some police agencies,
the issue of legitimacy has become existential as defunding police budgets has
proliferated as a means to take resources from departments and erode their
significance in the community.
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From an evidentiary standpoint, this research provides new evidence on
police organizational change using departments under tremendous pressure to
become legitimate within their environment. The study presents tangible
evidence as to what works to spur change and what detracts from change. The
result of the study is likely to be very important for practitioners as they seek
ways to enact change in police organizations. The literature on police reform is
clear that change in police organizations is complex and resistance is found at
many levels (Sabet 2012; Haake, Rantatalo, and Lindberg 2017; Schafer and
Varano 2017; Jacobs, van Witteloostuijn, and Christe‐Zeyse 2013). This
research could provide a new outlook on how to achieve change when the
paradigm of changing individual officers does not meet expectations.
Organization of Dissertation
This dissertation consists of six chapters. Chapter one is the current
chapter covering introductory matters and sets the stage for the rest of the
work. Chapter two is the literature review. In Chapter Two, I review past work
on several topics. Those topics include institutional theory, institutional theory
applied to policing, and police reform, Chapter three discusses my research
design and methods. Chapter four covers the quantitative findings from the
research. Chapter five contains the qualitative findings from the interviews.
Finally, in chapter six, I discuss the interpretations and implications of the
research. Chapter six brings everything together, and part of the chapter draws
conclusions of what Ferguson meant to policing in St. Louis County and if
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policing has made progress in the years that have passed since August of
2014.

Chapter 2: Literature Review
Introduction
The following chapters provide the relevant literature on institutional
theory, institutional theory applied to police agencies, and police reform. Each
chapter informs my research regarding the status and gaps of the literature.
The extant literature provides insight into why specific research methods were
used and why they are appropriate for the current research endeavor. Lastly,
the literature review provides valuable context for the reader for the research
methods and the research findings. The context is important because this
research involves a setting of governance and policing that is unique. With the
substantial number of independent police departments in St. Louis County and
the high-profile events over the last seven years, the research setting is rare. It
deserves consideration to place the findings in their proper context.
Theoretical Foundations of Institutional Theory
For this research, I examined the foundations of institutional theory and
applied it to modern police organizations. Starting with some assumptions,
Brunsson (2018, 60) says Western culture historically viewed individuals as
unique and distinguishable from their environment. The concept of separation
from the environment is a critical distinction that plays a central role in
institutional theory. Being distinct from their environment, individuals are
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assumed to have rationality and ownership for their behavior and actions. The
concept could also be thought of as free will where individuals are rational
actors. Holding the individual responsible for their own choices and behavior is
the cornerstone of western culture and Christianity, according to Brunsson.
Take a moment to consider the criminal justice system in the United States.
The system is built on the foundation of individual free will to make choices, and
when a person chooses to break the law, that person has culpability and may
face punishment for their actions. Only in exceptional cases does the
culpability become eroded because of mental illness or extreme mitigating
circumstances.
Following the paradigm of individuals as responsible for making rational
choices, modern organizations are thought to be separate from the environment
as well, with the leader at the top of the organization making rational choices
about the organization’s behavior. Organizations viewed in this vein are
collectives pursuing specific goals and exhibiting highly formalized social
structures (Scott 2003, 26). They can set objectives based on rational
calculations and coordinate efforts to achieve organizational goals. This
human-centered of organizations is depicted in many organizational charts, with
the organization’s brain represented at the top with the CEO and top
management making all the critical decisions about what the organization
should do and not do (Brunsson 2018, 61). The rest of the organization carries
out the thoughts and intentions of the leaders just as the individual’s body
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carries out the commands of the rational brain. For example, the CEO sets the
sales targets, the sales staff persuades customers to buy products and
services, and the factory worker assembles the widgets. A clear outgrowth of
the dichotomy between thought and action was the writing of Frederick Taylor,
who believed that management should devise the most efficient methods to
produce goods and services and the labor force should precisely carry out
those plans without questioning the methods or strategy of management (Taylor
2014). Inherent in the view that organizations are separate from the
environment similar to individuals, the organization makes rational decisions
about the future just as individuals make rational choices about their future.
Leaders of organizations make choices about their preferences for the
organization’s future and then make rational choices to fulfill that vision
(Brunsson 2018, 64). The assumption in this view of organizational life is that
the organization is independent of the environment and has the freedom to
make decisions independent of the external environment. The outside
environment has a minimal role in influencing those decisions.
Beginning around the time of the industrial revolution when the thinking
on organizations was focused on rational decision making, early studies of
organizations centered around the rise of bureaucracies as work transitioned
from an agrarian society with informal groups and families performing work to
formalized factory settings with rules and hierarchical structures organizing how
the work was to be done. Organizations and bureaucracies as we know them
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are a new development historically. Throughout the history of humanity, most
organizing of humans was done at a tribal level. The pointed rationality of this
new way of organizing human labor worked directly toward the organization’s
goals, whether that be fighting a war or producing widgets. Max Weber (2001)
famously called the unbending rationality of modern bureaucracies an "iron
cage" trapping modern man. The iron cage metaphor describes the constraints
that modern organizations place on individuals with layers of rules and authority
removing all creativity and free-thinking. All work is done in a prescribed
manner where the worker has little ownership over the job and is thought of as
one cog in a vast machine. The human spirit is subservient to the rationality of
the rules and the authority given to the organization’s offices.
During this time, the classical school of management was born (Bowditch
and Buono 2005, 8). The early writers on bureaucracy, such as Max Weber,
Henri Fayol, and Frederick Taylor heavily influenced the classical school of
management. Citing Weber in DiMaggio and Powell (Dimaggio and Powell
1983, 147), “it is primarily the capitalist market economy that demands that the
official administration of business be discharged precisely, unambiguously,
continuously, and with as much speed as possible. Normally, the exceptionally
large, modern capitalistic enterprises are themselves unequaled models of strict
bureaucratic organizations.” Frederick Taylor famously studied workers’ every
motion to find the most efficient combination of movements to maximize
productivity (Taylor 2014). Henri Fayol developed many familiar concepts in
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organizational life, such as span of control and the unity of command principle
asserting that employees only reports to one supervisor through a chain of
command (Fayol 2013). The concepts from the pioneers of organizational
studies are still alive and well in modern organizations with rigid hierarchies and
exacting methods to complete the work.
I now examine closer how the rational actor model of organizational and
institutional change plays out in different contexts. With the model, change
should occur as a rational adaptation in a competitive selection process
(Brunsson 2018, 18). For example, a profit-seeking business can quantify the
enterprise’s success by looking at profits or shareholder value. A lack of profit
or decreased revenue in this regard signals that change or reform is needed to
increase profit. Following the rational actor model of change, a business
changes its operation, structure, and personnel to increase profit. Examples of
this are pervasive. Companies add or remove service offerings to increase
revenue and profits. Car manufacturers are illustrative of this phenomenon.
Because of the popularity of Trucks SUVs, many car manufacturers have
decreased their sedan offerings and increased high-end truck and SUV
manufacturing to bolster profits. They do this after analyzing and calculating
profits based on consumer trends and manufacturing costs. These
manufacturers do not continue to make cars for nostalgia. They are driven by
revenues and profits.
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What about organizations that are not judged by profits and revenues?
Non-profit and government organizations are viewed in this same rational actor
perspective despite having fundamentally different incentives. These
organizations are undoubtedly constrained by budgets and revenues but are
not typically driven to maximize the payments for the sake of profit. They are
driven to achieve a mission. A school’s mission is to educate students. A
straightforward way to assess the success of a school is through the grades
and standardized test scores of students. Entire industries are built on
evaluating and improving these test scores. However, as most educators know,
educating students does not occur in a vacuum. A host of socioeconomic
factors play a role in student success. Wilson (2000) characterizes police
departments and schools as coping organizations. He describes these
organizations as ones that are unable to “observe neither the outputs nor the
outcomes of their operators” (p. 168). Wilson states that coping organizations
such as schools and police departments have problems defining objective
outcomes for success. For example, for police departments, what level of crime
is considered successful or even acceptable for a community? Indeed the total
absence of crime is a success, but what about the gradients falling below that
threshold. The definition of success is hard to define, considering the police do
not control many of the variables involved in controlling crime levels. As Wilson
states, they must cope with the situation they are given. They cannot change
many of the factors driving crime, such as poverty, mental illness, or high-
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volume retail centers. Their success is very dependent on the environment. It
can help or hinder the organization’s mission.
If Wilson is correct and the outputs and outcomes of schools and police
departments are hard to assess, what influences these organizations'
performance? How does the organization or society make any judgment as to
whether they are performing to expectations? Suppose the primary mission of
the police is to control crime and disorder, but no reliable and accurate
measures of these variables exist. How does society make sense of what the
police are doing? One could look at crime statistics, but these can be
notoriously noisy, with many factors that are entirely outside the control of
police departments. Early writers on "new institutionalism" answered this
question and rejected the view that organizations are only driven by
technical/rational concerns (Kraatz and Zajac 1996). Rather than being judged
on a numbers-driven bottom line, organizations in social service sectors are
judged on whether they satisfy sovereigns. Sovereigns are similar to
stakeholders; however, these individuals or groups hold resources and grant
approval or disapproval of an organization's activities. The sovereigns are
essential for an organization to gain or maintain legitimacy. In the opinion of
these early writers on institutionalism such as DiMaggio and Powell and Meyer
and Rowan (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; J. W. Meyer and Rowan 1977), the
evolution of many organizational fields had slowed, and rather than continually
adapting innovations, the organizations sought legitimacy with influential
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individuals and groups or sovereigns as the institutional theory literature calls
them. Using a police department as an example again, consider what happens
when a police chief announces a body camera program. Typically, oversightminded sovereigns embrace such programs and provide public praise and
support. The sovereigns, in this case, are city council members or local
business leaders. The general public may even see the body cameras as
something a modern police department should be doing. The approval and
support signals to others that the organization is legitimate and doing what is
appropriate for a modern police department. All of these actions are taken
despite mixed evidence on the effectiveness of body cameras for reducing
complaints and help with criminal prosecutions.
New institutionalism rejects the idea that organizations are separate and
distinct from the environment. New institutionalism views organizations and the
environment as closely connected. Rather than being a closed system, new
institutionalism views organizations as open systems connected to the
environment. According to Scott (2003, 28), “Organizations are open to and
dependent on flows of personnel, resources, and information from the outside.”
The environment plays a crucial role in shaping the reality of open
organizations. Rather than having a static view of reality, open organizations
have a malleable idea of reality and the environment in which they operate. In
this view, the organization is porous, with outside influences constantly shaping
the organization. As will be explained later, police departments of the
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professional era viewed themselves as insulated from society and the experts
when dealing with crime. The insular worldview would cause problems for
these police departments as they tried to navigate a changing world with
changing outlooks on civil rights the power of the police.
Because organizations are intertwined with their environment, they must
interact with that environment to secure resources. In essence, they must
convince the entities with the resources they need, that they are deserving of
support. The procurement of resources from the environment is a crucial
component of institutional theory. These resources range from goodwill to the
allocation of millions of dollars in a budget. Because organizations are an open
system, the environment permeates them and becomes part of them through
employees, the national and local culture, and laws.
I will now explain further how organizations and institutions signal to
sovereigns that they are legitimate and modern organizations. In the case of
police departments, the traditional rational and technical measures of success
are typically crime rates, crime clearance, and the degree to which the police
prevent disorder. If the department cannot lower crime rates or disorder, how
will the police chief demonstrate to sovereigns that the police department is
effective? Institutional theory posits that organizations enact rationalized myths
in their work to satisfy sovereigns. A rationalized myth is a prevailing norm
operating within a field of organizations that first started as an efficient, rational
way of conducting business (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Over time the operating
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norm becomes accepted as a best practice. In other words, the norm becomes
institutionalized in the field. Other similar organizations adopt the practice to
signal they are legitimate and operating as a modern organization. What
started as an improvement in operations for one organization during a specific
period to solve a problem may not be as effective for other organizations during
different periods. Take, for example, a city experiencing an acute increase in
crime. City officials and the public demand a response from the police
department. What will the responses look like? How will the public know that
the response is working or, better yet, satisfactory for all stakeholders? Meyer
and Rowan (1991) recognized organizations are driven to incorporate practices
that embody the prevailing rationalized concepts of organizational work. In part,
they do this to increase efficiency and effectiveness, but primarily to signal that
they are using accepted practices. In other words, organizations adopt these
institutionalized practices to improve their legitimacy and, thereby, survival
prospects. Meyer and Rowan state, "Institutionalization involves the processes
by which social processes, obligations, or actualities come to take on a rule like
status in social thought and action." (J. Meyer and Rowan 1991). The author’s
further state that adopting certain principles becomes rationalized myths of how
organizations should operate. For example, returning to the crime spike, a
typical response to the crime spike would be focused on police patrols and
increased arrests. There is evidence that this type of police activity works
(Rosenfeld, Deckard, and Blackburn 2014; Ratcliffe et al. 2011; Braga and
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Schnell 2013). From an institutional theory lens, the focused patrols and
increased arrests are implemented because they have become a rationalized
myth of how policing is to be done. Many sovereigns in the community expect
the police to demonstrate these activities in response to the crime spike. Other
approaches could work but may not align with what sovereigns believe is the
appropriate set of behaviors.
The modern emergency 911 system provides another example of this
principle. Having this system in place is universal in the United States and was
a rational response to the problem of the police being able to respond rapidly to
calls from citizens. The system has been a great success in the United States
and can be credited with saving thousands of lives over the decades. The
practice has been institutionalized to the point that most citizens would expect
to call 911 wherever they are, and the police will respond quickly to help them.
As Meyer and Rowan postulate, having a 911 system incorporates societally
legitimated rationalized elements into formal structures, thereby maximizing
legitimacy and increasing their resources and survival chances (p. 53). Imagine
a police department that opted not to maintain a 911 system. The backlash
from the public would be inevitable.
Organizations may implement practices and programs that are not borne
purely out of a rational/technical need. They may do it primarily for legitimacy
reasons. Again, the institutional theory would predict this organizational
behavior. The popular Drug Abuse and Resistance Education (DARE) program
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is an example of this in policing. Many school districts and parents expect
those police departments to offer a DARE program even though the evidence
for it’s effectiveness is weak (Ennett et al. 1994; Clayton, Cattarello, and
Johnstone 1996; Marquart et al. 1993). For a time, many citizens, police
officials, and school administrators believed DARE was effective for reducing
drug use in adolescents. While evidence against it’s efficacy has eroded this
belief, the prevailing logic is that the programs remain. The program has
become institutionalized. Another popular program still in use today is gun
buyback initiatives. These programs allow citizens to voluntarily sell their guns
to police departments as a way for the citizen to generate cash and for the
police department to reduce the number of firearms in the community. As with
DARE, the research on these programs reducing gun violence and crime are
not encouraging (Braga and Wintemute 2013). Despite the lack of evidence for
effectiveness, organizations continue to use these programs and, in many
cases, devote sizable resources to similar programs. The programs are
popular and signal to sovereigns that an effort is being made to reduce juvenile
drug use and gun violence.
Organizations can commit resources to programs not directly related to
rational/technical needs through what new institutionalism calls decoupling.
Rational/technical organizations strive to maintain a close relationship between
the structures and activities. For most corporations, the structure is closely
aligned with the technical requirements of the firm. Structures not contributing
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to the bottom line are eventually cut or defunded. Corporations commonly shed
work elements and employees no longer contributing to the bottom line.
Institutionalized organizations may decouple their activities from the structure of
the organization rather than cut the program (J. Meyer and Rowan 1991).
They protect the technical aspects of their operations from close inspection,
evaluation, and control to avoid losing legitimacy. According to Brunsson
(2018, 9) organizations develop double standards. One standard the internal
workings of the organization and the other for the external world. In the case of
DARE and gun buyback programs, the programs are used as signals to
sovereigns that the police department is doing all of the things expected of a
modern police department to decrease crime and disorder. Although these
programs may yield little success in terms of crime control, it is irrelevant. The
programs are offering signals to sovereigns that the organization is open to
reform (Brunsson 2018, 11). Decoupling allows organizations to maintain
programs providing little to the rational/technical needs of the core work while
providing the appropriate signal to sovereigns.
I now turn to the mechanisms for change within institutional theory.
DiMaggio and Powell wrote an article entitled, The Iron Cage Revisited:
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields
(Dimaggio and Powell 1983) setting forth the principles by which
institutionalized organizations change. They argued that bureaucratization in
society has been achieved and that many organizations were becoming
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homogenous. The article attempted to explain the convergence of
organizational form in society. Over time, the technical/rational improvements
become sparse, and all organizations catch up to state of the art in their
respective fields. This leads to a convergence of structure and form within an
organizational field. They define the organizational field as "organizations that,
in aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life" (Dimaggio and
Powell 1983, 148).
Three mechanisms are identified for isomorphic institutional change,
where organizational form converges. Those mechanisms are introduced here
and referenced throughout the dissertation. The three methods identified by
DiMaggio and Powell are the coercive dimension, memetic dimension, and
normative dimension. I explain each in order, starting with coercive. According
to DiMaggio and Powell's view, coercive forces come from the environment in
the form of legal or political mandates. Examples of this are state standards in
training or budgetary restraints imposed by local governments. The coercive
pressures to change the organization can be quite powerful. Take, for example,
a school district not maintaining state accreditation. The school district is at
heightened risk to lose the support of sovereigns and then lose funding from
local governments. Just recently, the idea of defunding police departments has
gained traction as a reform mechanism for police departments. This may be
the ultimate coercive pressure where an organization's budget is simply cut or
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reduced. These coercive pressures are often applied to an entire
organizational field and cause a convergence of organizational forms.
The next mechanism identified by DiMaggio and Powell is mimetic
processes. These processes are common when the goal and objectives of the
organizations are unclear and there is uncertainty in the environment (p. 151).
In uncertain times, the leaders of organizations will seek out models for their
organization. Without knowing for sure what technical solution is best,
organizations look to similar ones for a path forward. This is done to solve the
problem at hand and gain legitimacy for the organization. The organization
facing the uncertainty can rely on the fact they did what the leader in the field
did as a way to garner support from sovereigns. This is likely to occur
throughout the world as organizations and governments seek ways to protect
citizens from the COVID-19 pandemic while maintaining basic economic activity
levels. Organizations look at what other similar organizations are doing and
find models that fit best. The process of looking for models to emulate
increases the likelihood that organizations in a given field begin to look similar
to one another.
The final mechanism for change is normative pressure. Dimaggio and
Powell contend that the pressure stems from professionalism (p. 152). Before
exploring the normative mechanism, it is helpful to define professionalism
because it is a crucial concept used throughout this research. According to
Friedson, “The ideal-typical position of professionalism is founded on the official
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belief that the knowledge and skill of a particular specialization requires a
foundation in abstract concepts and formal learning and necessitates the
exercise of discretion.” (2013, 32). Freidson is particularly concerned with the
role of specialized knowledge and the use of discretion. In his view,
professionals must have a foundation of specialized knowledge to make good
choices when using discretion. Although the point may be taken as obvious, it
should not be assumed that all police officers at all ranks possess the
necessary specialized knowledge to properly use discretion.
Adhering to professional standards alone creates isomorphism as more
organizations adopt the principles of professionalism. Most professional
organizations have publications, conferences, and networking opportunities that
make it more likely to share ideas and standards among organizations. It is no
surprise this is the case, as that is the intent of professional bodies. DiMaggio
and Powell point out that because professional affiliations can enhance the
status of individuals, many leaders seek out positions on boards of professional
organizations (p.153). Representing the agency on those boards reinforces
the practices of that organization, thereby further spreading practices and
rationalized myths to other organizations. Within policing, numerous
organizations and associations exist to promote professional norms. Some of
them include F.B.I. National Academy Associates, National Organization of
Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE), Police Executive Research
Forum (PERF), and locally in St. Louis, the St. Louis Area Police Chiefs
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Association (SLAPCA). While their focus and composition may be different,
they all promote professional norms.
To summarize institutional theory, organizations are influenced by the
environments they operate. In some regards, the organization is the
environment considering that it is impossible to altogether remove the influence
of society's wider culture and influences. When the environment provides clear
signals for performance, the rational/technical aspects of the organization are
emphasized. For-profit businesses operate in such an environment where the
firm’s profit is a clear indicator of success or failure. Contrast this with what can
be called institutional environments where the signals of performance are
decoupled from the organization's operations. Take the following quote from
Katz and Maguire (2020), “Even when departmental and complaint data is
available, the lack of consistent reporting and measurement standards across
jurisdictions make it difficult to assess law enforcement performance. Although
several studies have set out to assess different performance measures, there is
still no consensus on how to best measure organizational performance.” The
quote crystallizes the difficulty in making accurate assessments of Wilson’s
coping mechanisms.
As the authors state in very frank terms, judging the performance of
police departments is complex. Because of this, police departments decouple
the technical aspects of their operations and rely on the signals from sovereigns
about performance. In some cases, all the organization can do is make a
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convincing argument that they are striving to achieve the goals important to
society (Brunsson 2018, 7). The idea of a lack of objective standards is
problematic for many observers but is the reality of coping organizations.
According to Brunsson (2018, 10),
The fact that reform is being attempted tells the outside world that the
organization is open to change and renewal. A visible willingness to
change may make it easier for the organization to acquire resources and
support and shield itself from criticism and external intervention. Such an
interpretation helps explain why so many reforms are attempted, even
though they have little effect on structures and processes, let alone on
results.
Institutional Theory Applied to Police Departments
I now turn to the literature using institutional theory to describe the
behavior of police departments. The literature applying institutional theory to
police organizations first appeared in literature in the early 1990s with an article
entitled, Institutional Perspective on Policing by Crank and Langworthy (1992).
Previous research had looked at the interplay of politics and police activity
(Surette 1985). Still, the Crank and Langworthy article was perhaps the first
writing to explicitly use institutional theory to examine local police departments.
The authors made the case that local departments are highly institutionalized
using powerful myths about their activities to attain legitimacy from sovereigns.
This view contrasts with a highly rational view of departments that are focused
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on techniques and procedures that are narrowly defined for only crime-fighting.
The article clarified the need for legitimacy and the resultant support from
sovereigns. According to Crank and Langworthy, police departments engage in
ceremonial processes to regain legitimacy, such as replacing a police chief
during a crisis. The contribution of this article was to emphasize that police
departments are always working within the context of their environment.
Departments are not entirely closed to their environments. They conclude that
local police departments are recognized as the natural order of things in cities
are not going away (p.360). They are genuinely institutionalized organizations
that survive not because they are exemplars of rational progress but because
they can satisfy the needs of sovereigns who provide the critical support they
need.
In the years following the Crank and Langworthy article, numerous other
researchers began using institutional theory as a lens to examine the adoption
of specific police practices and criminal justice reform. John Crank, the
coauthor of the original 1992 article, published two other papers promulgating
using institutional theory to view police departments. Crank’s writings do not
involve quantitative research but rather look at the ceremonial aspects of police
departments’ behavior, making the case that much of what they do has little
impact on traditional crime-fighting and more to do with symbolism and
messaging to sovereigns. For example, in his 1994 article, (Crank 1994)
explained that to legitimize the adoption of community policing in the late 20th
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century, police departments invoked the 18th-century myth of the local police
and the watchman. The image of the local cop patrolling the beat and having
an intimate relationship with the community is still used today by the police and
community members alike. The cop walking the sidewalks is still romanticized
even though most officers in the United States are in a patrol car for most of the
day.
After the foundation-setting articles on institutional theory, other
researchers began to apply case study and quantitative methods to test the
theory. Marquart et al. examined drug enforcement policies in Texas during the
1980s and found that arrests remained low. Still, convictions increased to “do
something” about the perceived drug problem (Marquart et al. 1993). McCorkle
et al. looked at the changes in probation and parole policies over decades and
found that despite external communication of change, the essential functions
remained the same (McCorkle and Crank 1996). The findings support the
concept of loose coupling in institutional theory, where the core function
remains static and detached from close examination while outward messaging
signals a change.
Starting in the 2000s, research in the field began to use institutional
theory to explain the implementation of specific practices within police
departments. Katz (2001) used a multi-method design to determine why police
departments would form a gang unit. His findings suggest that gang units were
formed primarily because of political pressure and increasing national media
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coverage of gang activity. The actual presence of gang activity in the localities
studied was lacking. The research supported the idea that organizations enact
programs to signal they are doing what is thought of as conforming to the norms
of a modern organization. In the case of gangs, having a gang unit satisfies the
sovereigns that action is underway to address the gang issue even though the
actual gang problem may not be severe.
Giblin (2006) examined the creation of crime analysis units using
institutional theory. Giblin surveyed 160 police agencies about the creation of
crime analysis units. The survey asked questions to determine if the
department had mimicked other departments, whether accreditation was an
influence, and if grant funding was used. All these factors could potentially
impact a department starting a crime analysis unit. Giblin found that crime rates
were not the determining factor in creating a crime analysis unit. Rather,
accreditation from the Commission on Accreditation of Law Enforcement
Agencies or CALEA was a driving factor. Pressure from accreditation is an
excellent example of normative pressure or perhaps even coercive pressure.
As institutional theory would predict, departments created crime analysis units
not only because of a rational/technical need but also because outside forces
were applying influence to cause the change.
Renauer (2007) examined the implementation of community policing
strategies in police departments using institutional theory in conjunction with
how cities use urban space through growth politics. The writing did not present
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data to test hypotheses but made several propositions about community
policing in a municipal setting. Renauer cited Swanstrom (1985) and used the
framework of exchange value versus use value to predict the implementation of
community policing. In short, Renauer postulated that conservative growth
politics cities that seek to lower taxes and attract investment would be less likely
to engage in community policing strategies. Using community policing would
decentralize power for the conservative regime. He believes the conservative
regimes are more likely to use crackdowns and increased arrests to lower
crimes that increase exchange value. Alternatively, Renauer theorized that
liberal growth cities that value the use-value of property would focus more on
community policing and the strengthening of relationships with community
groups. A key takeaway from the work is that if Renauer is correct, police
departments are highly influenced by the political environment. In other words,
the rational/technical needs of crime-fighting may be subservient to the desires
of the political sovereigns. This research is similar to the findings of Stucky
(2005), who found that cities with strong mayors were more likely to be
responsive to the complaints of crime issues from citizens.
The use of statistics to influence police operations seems to fit squarely
within a rational/technical paradigm of managing police operations. Using
statistics and crime data for these purposes was popularized by the NYPD's
use of COMPSTAT in the 1990s under former NYPD Commissioner, Bill
Bratton. NYPD COMPSTAT is credited with the notable decrease in crime with
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New York City throughout the 1990s. COMPSTAT style programs eventually
spread throughout the United States and could now be considered a standard
practice in law enforcement. Willis et al. (2007) examined the use of
COMPSTAT in other police organizations throughout the United States to test
whether the spread of it was due to the rational/technical needs of police
organizations or because of institutional influences. Following previous
research, they found that institutional theory would predict the spread of
COMPSTAT because of the need to satisfy powerful sovereigns (p. 154).
The researchers selected three police departments that had
implemented COMPSTAT to study their theories to test the theory. They used
participant observation and formal interviews to gather data. The researchers
point out that according to a rational/technical approach, one would expect
these police departments to experience crime increases before implementing
COMPSTAT. However, this was not the case, as none of the sites had
unusually high crime. All sites had been influenced to adopt COMPSTAT
through either professional contacts or presentations at professional
conferences. Clearly, the departments were influenced by mimetic forces. The
researchers conclude that the implementation of COMPSTAT in their study
sites was a combination of institutional pressure and rational/technical needs to
formulate better crime control strategies.
Giblin and Burruss (2009) used secondary survey data to examine the
influence of outside funding in community policing efforts. Using factor
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analysis, the researchers found that funding is not as influential as other
institutional pressures such as professional associations and publications. The
same research team examined community policing implementation using the
survey to explore the role of emulation among organizations (2014). The
researchers wanted to determine the explanatory power of isomorphic
processes in adopting community policing strategies (p. 332). They were
particularly interested in peer emulation and how it spreads from one jurisdiction
to another. Using structural equation modeling, the researchers determined
that police organization were more likely to adopt community policing practices
when institutional support was present. Institutional pressures, such as
publications and professional organizations, had a strong effect. The
researchers also found that the perception of rising crime rates also had an
impact. The finding supports the assertion by Willis et al. (2007) that
rational/technical considerations also play a part in conjunction with sovereign
influence the decision making of police departments.
King (2014) used institutional theory to research police organizations
disbanding in the 1990s. Because disbanded police organizations, by their very
nature do not respond to surveys and requests for information, King interviewed
key informants by phone to gather information on the institutional factors
surrounding the disbanding of the police departments. King found that if the
relationships with key sovereigns were strained, disbanding was more likely (p.
682). King elaborated by stating that some of the police agencies had violated
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the expectations of the sovereigns by engaging in illegal behavior of various
types. Interestingly, 86 percent of the agencies he studied did not even report
crime statistics, and crime issues did not seem to be a factor for disbanding,
leading to support for the notion that technical/rational influences were not
strong.
Matusiak (2014) applied institutional theory to a sample of 446 Texas
police chiefs to test the influence of institutional sovereigns. The researcher
surveyed the police chiefs while they attended leadership training through a
state-mandated program. The dependent variable for the research was a
combination of 31 variables measuring the chiefs' perceptions of various
sovereigns. Some of the sovereigns included in the study were state and
federal law enforcement agencies, national media, criminal justice
organizations, police unions, medical providers, elected officials, and local
media. Matusiak found that just looking at the mean scores; chiefs held local
criminal justice organizations as most important, followed by medical providers.
To determine what predicted the views of sovereigns, the researcher used a
regression model with various individual attributes of the chiefs serving as the
independent variables. The regression analysis revealed that the chiefs'
perspectives on elected representatives and local media were heavily
influenced by education. That is, chiefs with higher educational levels placed
more weight on the influence of elected officials and local media. Matusiak's
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research is important because it provides insight as to why certain chiefs view
certain sovereigns as more important than others.
Brisner and King (2016) used institutional theory to look at police
organizations' response to the threat of disasters, accidents, and terrorism. In a
post 9/11 world, it would follow that police organizations make adjustments to
the organization from a rational/technical perspective to prepare and respond to
future incidents. The researchers surveyed 350 local police chiefs from Texas
as they attended professional leadership training. For the dependent variable,
the survey asked the local police chiefs the risk posed to their agency by
different threats. The independent variables used questions about sovereigns
for the police chiefs. For this survey the sovereigns included federal and state
law enforcement organizations, national media, local E.M.S., elected
representatives, and community organizations. The researchers found that
institutional sovereigns had a significant influence on agencies' assessments of
threat. Institutional pressures had more of an effect on their outlook than did
organizational structure or the demographics of the chiefs.
Carter (2016) used institutional theory to predict the adoption of
intelligence-led policing from a sample of 254 police organizations. Carter
assessed the institutional pressures on police agencies to adopt intelligence-led
policing by looking at how frequently they consulted other agencies and the
closeness of their relationships with other agencies. Additionally, the
researcher asked questions about the consumption of professional publications
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and intelligence meetings. Carter found that believing intelligence-led policing
could provide crime control benefits, had the most notable impact on the
adoption of intelligence-led policing. It is important to note that it was the belief
that that the new strategy could impact crime would lend support to a
rational/technical approach, yet the research was unclear as to where the belief
originated.
Worden and Mclean (2017) examined the implementation of procedural
justice in two New York State cities through the lens of institutional theory. The
research found that the implementation of procedural justice practice was
shallow and that although its use is promising, it becomes hard to judge the
outcomes of it objectively when applied by officers in the field. From an
institutional perspective, the authors found that procedural justice is loosely
coupled when superimposed on the bureaucratic structures of the police
departments. The use of procedural justice by officers is comparable to body
cameras and other reform-oriented programs. The programs have the support
of sovereigns and maintain community support for the police department but
may do little to increase the technical/rational position of the department.
In the last few years (post Ferguson) other research has used
institutional theory to examine how police departments implement reform and
specific programs (Smith 2019; Matusiak 2019; Terpstra 2020; Cho 2017).
Similar to some of the foundational studies reviewed, the institutional
environment holds more influence on police chiefs and police agencies than
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does the technical gains from change. However, a police department may
realize both technical gains and institutional legitimacy from adopting certain
practices and reforms. A good example of this is the implementation of body
worn cameras. Smith (2019) examined the adoption of the cameras using
secondary data and found that police departments can benefit both in terms of
organizational legitimacy and increased technical effectiveness. Body cameras
are a strong signal to sovereigns that a police department is serious about
transparency and accountability. While the department gains the legitimacy
benefits of the body camera implementation, it also gains the ability to use the
footage as evidence to aid in prosecutions.
The literature on institutional theory applied to police departments
provides evidence that many organizations do in fact strive to satisfy the
institutional environment in which they are embedded. It appears based on the
research that police departments creates specialized work units and adapt
specific policing practices to demonstrate to sovereigns that they are
contemporary organizations implementing best practices in the field whether or
not it brings technical improvements. Some of the gaps in the research include
what specific professional associations influence departments and what is the
thought process of organizations when they carry out reform efforts. My
research attempts to shore-up some of the gaps in the research by surveying
departments on what professional associations were influential and interviewing
police officials about their influences and concerns when implementing specific
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reform efforts. As mentioned earlier, the implication of this is that academics
and practitioners can make better judgments about how to influence change
within the policing profession.
Police Reform
I now turn to the extant literature on police reform. Police reform has
occurred in waves throughout the last hundred plus years in the United States
and has been studied extensively since the late 1960s. Much of the research
was prompted by the unrest and discontent with the police during the 1960s.
This period witnessed police brutality in response to the civil rights movement
and Vietnam War protests. Like modern police reform movements, the
grievances of the communities during these episodes were much broader than
just police issues. Still, it was an interaction with police that sparked most of
these incidents. According to Walker (Walker 2012), efforts to reform the police
are more than a century old. Walker points out that, unfortunately, most of
these reforms faded away over time. Over the years, several variants of
community policing have appeared with promise only to lose popularity and
eventual use. This section of the literature review provides a high-level
overview of police reform in the United States. Much of the literature lacks
quantitative research on extensive and comprehensive reform efforts in police
departments. The lack of research is because it is rare for police departments
to enact reform in a systematic manner conducive to social science research.
Reform efforts are often phased in gradually over long periods, and data is not
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available to researchers (Walker 2012). In the last two decades, reform efforts
have become more systematic with the Department of Justice pattern and
practice investigations that have definitive start dates. These investigations are
discussed later in the paper.
Some of the earliest attempts to reform the police came in the twentieth
century in what many scholars refer to as the professional era or reform era.
The period was a reaction to the politicization of police forces in the late 1800s
and early 1900s when officers were beholden to local politicians for jobs.
Politicians routinely used officers to enforce laws and provide favors at the
direction of local elected officials (Uchida 2005). Uchida (2005) states the local
political machines in urban centers controlled all local government along with
the police departments. The local political bosses hired and fired police
officers, making them beholden to the local official. The initial formation of
policing was overtly political and a result of America’s colonial past. Americans
wanted direct democracy and eschewed a central authority organizing the
police (Millen 2019, pt. 1196). The result was a highly localized police force
centered around local political districts. The benefit of this arrangement was that
the police of that era were keenly aware of the community’s desires through the
lens of the local politician.
An aspect of this local political machinery is the initial formation of police
forces in the United States as a way to protect the ruling class from uprisings of
either enslaved people in the South or the working class in the North (Durr
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2015; Turner, Giacopassi, and Vandiver 2006). Rather than viewing the police
as an institution of public safety for the good of all society, police forces were a
means to maintain the ruling class’s power in America according to the line of
thinking. Citing Millen (2019, pt. 1384), policing began as soon as there was
something to protect in the form of slave patrols, watchmen, sheriffs,
constables, and eventually police departments. The influence of politicians
combined with a lack of professional standards resulted in blatant corruption
and brutality from some of the early urban police forces in the United States.
In response to the political era’s shortcomings, reform efforts focused on
making policing professional by implementing civil service standards such as
objective standards for employment and testing. The movement to
professionalize the police occurred in stride with the more significant movement
toward professionalization in all facets of government in the United States in the
first half of the 20th century. Along with better hiring standards, the policing
profession made efforts to insulate itself from the influence of politicians and the
public. The impetus was to provide separation from the direct influence of
politicians so that officers make decisions based on professional standards and
norms rather than purely political motives. The overall aim of the reforms was
to instill a sense of scientific management to policing that had been lacking
during the political era. According to Uchida (2005), the initial iteration of reform
efforts put forth by reformers was not embraced like the second round initiated
by police chiefs such as August Vollmar and O.W. Wilson near the middle of the
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twentieth century. The second round resulted in the adoption of formal hiring
standards and rigid bureaucracy.
Around the same time as the professionalization efforts, the United
States made huge technology advancements and expanded into the suburbs as
the automobile and interstate highways became a mainstream staple of
American society. Society was changing and so were the police. These key
innovations of the twentieth century moved many officers from walking the beat
to riding in a patrol car with two-way radios answering calls from citizens calling
the police over the phone. The innovative technology was becoming available
while the suburbs were expanding out from the central cities. It was not just
that the police had the radios and patrol cars available; it was that they were
now necessary to patrol the low-density suburban streets. The outgrowth of
these changes was combined with a new professional ethos that was
increasingly insular and focused only on enforcement. A prototype of this era
was the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) under the leadership of William
Parker during the 1950s and 1960s. The LAPD of this era was known for its
law-and-order approach with heavy reliance on the latest technology and
investigative techniques. The philosophy of the professional era and chiefs
such as William Parker, was that the police are the experts focused on solving
crime and enforcing the law. The public’s input was not viewed as highly
valued or even necessary for the effective functioning of a police department.
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Departments of this ilk were internally focused with lowered emphasis on the
public’s views.
The detached and rigid professional era successfully removed political
influence from policing but created new problems in the process. Isolation from
political machines and the community may curtail favors and bribes, but it also
makes police departments unresponsive and insensitive to the community's
desires. Throughout the twentieth century, minority communities complained of
mistreatment by police forces. Some of the mistreatment and outright brutality
was in plain sight during the civil rights movement in 1963 when Bull Connor,
the Birmingham, Alabama Police Commissioner, used fire hoses and police
dogs on protestors led by Martin Luther King. Despite the evidence of brutality,
the claims were largely ignored, and the resentment for the police departments
built over time. Some of the collective grievances erupted with unrest and
rioting in the late 60s, with major riots in Los Angeles, Newark, and Detroit.
During the mid to late 1960s, many cities in the United States experienced
rioting (Uchida 2005). During this time reformers recognized the drawbacks of
the professional era and moved to reverse some of the consequences of
isolating the community.
Spurred by the findings of the Kerner Commission (Kerner 1968), a study
of the causes of civil unrest commissioned by President Lyndon Johnson. The
Kerner Commission report acknowledged that although the riots of the late
sixties were sparked by more or less routine police actions such as arrests, the
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following unrest was an outpouring of grievances from the community that had
built up over decades as the community endured abuses of power from the
police. The findings of the Kerner Commission motivated moving toward a
model of policing integrating the input of the community. The model is the basis
of community policing. Some of these central tenets of community policing
remain in modern police departments. Those tenets are to seek community
input and feedback about police operations, partner with citizens to reduce
crime, and hire officers that are representative of the community in terms of
gender and race.
Adding to the landscape of reform in the 1960s were United States
Supreme Court rulings that curtailed police powers. Two of those cases were
Mapp v. Ohio in 1961 and Miranda v. Arizona in 1966. In Mapp, the Supreme
Court ruled that the
“exclusionary rule” barring unconstitutionally obtained evidence from being used
in court applied to local officers. Before the case, the exclusionary rule only
applied to federal law enforcement officers. By applying it to local officers,
many believed that criminal investigations would be impeded. In Miranda, the
Court ruled that officers must inform suspects that they have a right not to make
statements to the police. The Supreme Court reasoned that a police officer or
detective could easily overwhelm a citizen with a sense of having to speak with
the police. The Court concluded this pressure to speak to the police must be
balanced by informing citizens of their right to remain silent and counsel. At the
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time, both of these cases were thought to have devastating effects on the
efficacy of the police. Over time, both cases became part of the standard
operating environment for the police in the United States.
Reform efforts of the last fifty years consist of themes coming mainly
from the community policing era. As stated, some of those include hiring
officers that are representative of the community, increasing the education
levels of officers, creating civilian oversight bodies, and implementing
community policing efforts. More recently, reforms have focused on adapting
body cameras and technology to improve accountability. Unfortunately, many
of these efforts were not institutionalized throughout all 18,000 police agencies
throughout the United States. Instead, they were started and implemented to
varying degrees depending on the individual departments and the state or local
political context. The haphazard nature of the reforms highlights what could be
considered a weakness of the American Federalism system for local policing.
Without national coordination, reform efforts are challenging to achieve
uniformly throughout the nation, creating pockets of innovation and stagnation.
Skogan provides an overview of the failures of police reform efforts in his
2008 article entitled, Why Reforms Fail (Skogan 2008). As the title
foreshadows, Skogan is clear that efforts to change police departments often
fall short. Take, for example, the LAPD after the Rodney King Incident in 1991.
The LAPD made many changes, including hiring an African American chief from
Philadelphia and adding thousands of more officers to the force. Unfortunately,
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the department was again in the middle of a crisis by the late 1990s with the
Rampart scandal. Officers from the Rampart CRASH Gang unit had become a
rogue group of officers routinely robbing drug dealers and planting evidence to
make cases. Skogan identifies numerous areas throughout a police agency
where reform efforts can be stifled. Reform can be thwarted from the line
officers, first-line supervision, middle management, the police union, or other
factors such as more pressing problems within a department. All of this is to
say that reform efforts in police organizations are a daunting task. The inertia of
the historical institutional belief system is simply too much to overcome for
many organizations.
Walker (2012) sees the officer subculture as a significant roadblock to
implementing change. Crank (1998, 15) asserts that culture carries
institutionalized values. He says, “The idea that some ways of doing things
become valued in themselves means that they have become institutionalized:
we do them because we share a belief that they are the right things to do.”
These shared beliefs can be tough to change and, in some cases, become
entangled in the organization’s identity as a social construct (Jacobs, van
Witteloostuijn, and Christe‐Zeyse 2013). Much of the literature on failed police
reform focuses on the problems of entrenched culture and the command
structure of police departments (Crank 1998; Armacost 2003; Chan 1996;
Hassell, “Solomon” Zhao, and Maguire 2003). One should not underestimate
the power of these forces when considering a change in police organizations.
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As Sparrow states, “Having a strong personal commitment to the values with
which they have ‘grown-up,’ police officers will find any hint of a proposed
change in the police culture extremely threatening.” (1988). Whereas Skogan
correctly points out that while resistance to change can occur throughout the
police organization, the common thread may be the police culture.
The tradition within police organizations throughout the United States is
for commissioned officers to start at the rank of patrol officer and then move
progressively to more prestigious roles such as detective, sergeant, and then
the management ranks. The average police chief in a U.S. agency has risen
through the ranks in a police organization over a career. The result of this
system is a firm adherence to police values and dispositions. As Lau points
out, the problem with this arrangement is that most officers from patrol to the
chief have been institutionalized to the values of the organization and the police
culture (Lau 2004). Pierson (2004, 153) makes a similar point when he alludes
to the idea that the actors are not making the institution; the institution is making
the actors. In the case of a police organization, a chief rising through the ranks
has been conditioned and prepared to maintain the institution’s culture. The
profound implication of the statement is that the status quo becomes a selffulfilling prophecy.
The last two decades have seen a new development in police reform
within the United States. Partly in response to the Rodney King incident, In
1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
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(42 U.S.C. § 14141) that enables the U.S. Department of Justice to investigate
and sue police departments to enact reforms (Harmon 2017). These
investigations are referred to as pattern and practice investigations. The
investigations have been used extensively over the last two and a half decades
to initiate reform in police departments. Since the inception of the legislative
authority, more than 25 departments received Department of Justice
intervention (Police Executive Research Forum 2013). Most federal
investigations review practices dealing with use of force, investigations, early
intervention systems, and bias-based policing. Many departments voluntarily
submit to a consent decree after the investigation to avoid litigation by the
Department of Justice. For example, the Department of Justice investigated the
Ferguson, MO Police Department following the death of Michael Brown in 2014.
In 2016, the Ferguson City Council accepted the conditions of the decree rather
than face litigation from the Department of Justice (Wagner, Laura 2016).
Once a police department agrees with the terms of the decree, the department
is mandated to enact reforms that are evaluated and monitored by a federal
judge.
The pattern and practice investigations are initiated to investigate
systemic misconduct from police agencies (Police Executive Research Forum
2013). Some examples include pattern and practice investigations of wellknown departments such as the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). The
LAPD was investigated after what is known as the Rampart Scandal in the late
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1990s, where an officer of the Rampart CRASH gang unit were found to be
routinely planting evidence on suspects, using excessive force, making false
arrests, and even committing robberies (Domanick 2015). In 2000, the Los
Angeles City Council agreed to accept the consent decree. The decree
ultimately paved the way for famed NYPD police commissioner, Bill Bratton, to
become the police chief of the LAPD and implement what appears to be lasting
reform for the LAPD. Another example of a consent decree that arguably did
not have the success of the LAPD decree is from Oakland, California. Oakland
has been under a consent decree since 2003 and has gone through numerous
chiefs under the decree. The Oakland police have failed to be scandal-free for
any significant amount of time since under decree. Oakland serves as an
unfortunate example of how intractable the police department can be when
facing change.
Many of the consent decrees last for years, some stretching over a
decade, costing the city millions of dollars to enact the changes. Consent
decrees as a method to reform police departments in the United States highlight
the immense difficulty when trying to change decades of custom and culture in
police departments. The successfully reformed department can be an example
for other jurisdictions needing reform. To date, little academic research has
been conducted on the effectiveness of consent decrees to enact lasting reform
(Walker 2012). Some researchers point out that the data from the federal
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interventions are hard to access, thus making research difficult (Alpert, McLean,
and Wolfe 2017).
Reforming the police has been a long-standing practice in the United
States. It started as a way to break from the overt political nature of policing in
the late 19th century and has continued until today with attempts to integrate the
police with the communities they serve. The discourse over police reform
occurs at all levels of government, from city councils to the President of the
United States. The implementation of reform has occurred slowly and
piecemeal, with efforts being implemented in local departments with little
systematic oversight from state and federal agencies. Because of the
incongruence of efforts, studying the reform efforts for policing as a whole is
difficult. The goals of this research should add to the literature on what factors
lead to reform and how the reform is implemented on a local level.
Hypotheses
I have derived several hypotheses from the literature review to test the
degree and nature of change within St. Louis County municipal police
departments. Using a survey instrument described in the next chapter, I
explore different dimensions of institutional theory that may help explain why
some departments change more than others. The hypotheses are guided by
and tied back to the dimensions of institutional theory. The hypotheses are as
follows:
1. Departments with greater normative influence will enact more change.
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2. Departments with greater mimetic influence will enact more change.
3. Departments with greater coercive influence will enact more change.
Hypothesis one is derived from the normative dimension of institutional
theory. The dimension is concerned with the influence of professional norms
and acceptable conduct in a given occupation. Departments influenced more
by professional organizations such as SLAPCA, PERF, FBINA, and NOBLE are
more likely to enact change because those organizations are considered
thought leaders at the local and national levels. The professional organizations
mentioned embody modern professional norms for police departments. If
departments consider themselves professional, they are influenced by what
these organizations view as professional and should enact progressive change.
Mimetic influence is copying or emulating other departments. Recall that
this comes from situations with no clear precedent for organizational action. In
those cases, the rational choice for action is not clear, and organizations look to
other organizations for cues and direction on the best option. Faced with the
uncertain situation post-Ferguson, one could expect that departments with
strong mimetic influence would enact more change. The demands on local
departments in 2014 were extreme because of intense scrutiny and its
amplification through social media. Based on the history of policing in St. Louis
County, pressure such as this had never been experienced before.
Within the paradigm of institutional theory, the coercive dimension is when
an organization is pressured to act because a body or office with authority is
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threatening some official action against the organization. This could be a city
council cutting funding from a budget or an accreditation agency stripping
accreditation. For local police departments, many coercive pressures could
exist. Recent efforts to defund the police in some jurisdictions are a clear
example of coercive force or at least rhetoric. One would expect that if coercive
pressure was applied to a department either from elected officials, the federal
government, or unions, the department would enact more change. Hypothesis
three tests this dimension of institutional theory.
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Chapter 3: Research Methods
Introduction
This research aims to use institutional theory to explain reform by police
departments in St. Louis County after the events in Ferguson. The death of
Michael Brown and the following protests and responses to protest should be
considered a focusing event (Birkland 2011). Focusing events draw attention to
a situation or issue that was not widely known as a problem. The death of
Michael Brown is a focusing event that brought hyper-scrutiny to the policing
practices in St. Louis County. The event itself and the protests over the
following weeks drew in national and international media attention. Throughout
the late summer and fall of 2014, St. Louis County policing practices stayed in
the media spotlight. Even years after the initial event, the scrutiny continued as
local St. Louis events such as the Jason Stockley verdict and national events
such as the killing of George Floyd in May of 2020 stirred new emotion and
rekindled criticisms. If police departments are open to their environments to
any degree, one would theorize change would occur given the pressures
applied in 2014 and beyond. The pressure could originate in several places
such as coercive pressure from sovereigns or normative and mimetic pressure
from peers and professional groups. The assertions thus far are straightforward
and intuitive. A set of deeper questions remain about what police departments
within St. Louis County changed and what specific factors brought about that
change. It is unlikely that the shift was uniform across all departments. I
theorize that police departments in St. Louis County should have been
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incentivized by environmental pressures to change their respective
organizations. I predict that pressure from sovereigns will induce departments
to make reform changes. To make such a prediction is not necessarily bold or
cutting edge. It is more important to explain how the change occurs and why
some departments embrace the change while others seem more apt to
continue with the status quo. This chapter discusses the research design and
rationale, methods, and ethical concerns for the researcher.
Research Design and Rationale
The primary instrument to answer the research questions is a survey
administered to police departments in St. Louis County. The first part of the
survey is comprised of items assessing the degree to which police departments
in St. Louis County answered calls for reform. The answers to these questions
serve as the dependent variable in the study. The second half of the survey
asks questions about the influences upon the police department. These
questions examine the role of sovereigns or stakeholders and professional
norms for the police departments and the possibility of influencing the
department to make changes.
The overall rationale for the design is that research needs to be
conducted on the change in police practices in St. Louis County after 2014.
With all the attention on the Ferguson Police Department and its court system in
the media and elsewhere throughout the nation. A fundamental question is
whether policies and practices were changed or revised in other nearby
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departments to reflect reformers' desire. Did all the effort make a difference? A
second question to answer is how departments changed operations after
Ferguson. How were the changes implemented? Did the mindset and posture
toward the administration of justice change, or were the differences only
symbolic? Of course, there are many ways that a researcher could potentially
examine this issue. Still, I believe a practical way to assess the departments is
by asking departments directly about their formal policies and procedures. As a
researcher and practitioner in the field, I am aware that the formal policies and
procedures could differ from practices, but that would require different methods
to be employed and is beyond the scope of this research. In sum, these
research methods provide an accessible and practical way to judge the change
in departments after 2014.
Along with surveys, I assess change in St. Louis County police
departments through interviews with police chiefs. The interviews are voluntary
and solicited through the survey. The interviews provide greater context for the
changes during the study period. The interviews have a standard set of
questions designed to elicit responses and reactions to changes since 2014. It
is one thing to know a policy changed and another to know the motivation and
story behind the change. The interviews provide an opportunity for those willing
to tell their story behind the change. The interviews were conducted over video
conference or phone call for convenience and COVID-19 protocols.
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Role of the Researcher
As the researcher, I created the survey instrument, administered the
survey, and interviewed the police chiefs. As a practitioner in the field for 20
years, I have a vast degree of knowledge and insight into police practices other
researchers may lack. I have worked at numerous levels within a large police
department, been a trainer at a police academy, and a CALEA accreditation
manager. Within these positions, I have had the privilege of working on
numerous projects that involve examining current policing practices and
improving methods. For example, I participated in seminars with the Center for
Policing Equity and collaborated with the Policing Project at NYU. These
experiences give me the context for the information obtained during the
research. The downside to this experience in the field is that I may lack
objectivity when looking at some policies compared to a researcher with no
prior policing expertise. On balance I am confident that my experience in the
policing field allows me to understand the intricacies of the issues faced by
police departments and provide a fair and accurate portrayal of their respective
responses to calls for reform.
Methodological Approach
Department Selection
The departments selected for this study are the police departments in St.
Louis County. When the survey was distributed, there were 53 departments
within the county, but that number fluctuates as small departments fold and
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contract with other departments for service (Karr 2016). Nearly all these
departments are under 100 officers, with only three over 100. The biggest
department, the St. Louis County Police Department, was not included in the
research because of its large size (nearly 1,000 officers) relative to the other
departments. Two other departments of over 100 officers were included in the
survey. By limiting the size of the departments, most departments have similar
operating and management issues.
The intent was to have as many departments as possible participate in
the study. The availability of data on the departments varies widely. Some
departments list the name and phone number of the police chief on the
department website. I called some of those chiefs, and they answered the call
themselves. That type of accessibility should be applauded. On the other end
of the spectrum, some departments had basic websites that provided no
working numbers or a simple method to contact anyone from the department.
Knowing that accessibility was a challenge and to promote full participation in
the study, I advertised the research to the St. Louis Area Police Chiefs
Association and encouraged participation. Along with promoting the survey at
the meetings, I called and emailed numerous chiefs soliciting their participation.
Many departments did not respond to the emails and phone calls, but others
immediately completed the survey once prompted.
For the interviews of police officials about reform, I asked a question on
the survey about participating in an interview. Once those chiefs were
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identified, I reached out to them personally and conducted the interviews using
the Zoom video conferencing platform for four interviews and a phone call for
one. The interviews were not recorded but memorialized with notetaking. I
conducted five interviews which are discussed in a later chapter.
Survey Instrument
The survey asked a series of questions to serve as the basis for the
independent and dependent variables. For the dependent variable, questions
were asked about changes to policies and practices and the time frame. The
items were scored to create a composite score for each department. I used two
primary sources to create the survey items assessing change in policing
practices. The first source came from consolidating the calls for change by
activists, academics, experts, and government bodies after the events in
Ferguson. Fortunately, these calls for change have been researched and
memorialized by the Ferguson Commission's Forward through Ferguson: A
Path Toward Racial Equity (Ferguson Commission 2015) and The President's
Task Force on 21st Century Policing (Office of Community Oriented Policing
Services 2015). The calls for action in both reports cover a wide range of urban
issues, including police-community relations, police responded to the protest,
education, police training, transportation, and racial equity. I selected the calls
for action relevant to local police departments from the two reports and
formulated questions assessing the reform efforts of local police departments in
St. Louis County. Along with the calls for change from the two extant reports, I
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also included items on the survey from my professional experience that
assesses the degree to which local departments are implementing the latest in
progressive police practices. Some of these practices are only found in very
progressive police departments. For example, the survey contains a question
asking if a written waiver is required for consent searches. Such policies are
rare to find in police department policies. Asking about the use of such a policy
would indicate a strong willingness to change.
The items assessing the change in policing practices are shown in Table
2. The respondent has three response options for the initial question. Those
options are “Yes, “Planning on implementing,” and “No.” If the answer is yes,
the survey branched to another question asking what year the policy was
implemented. The options for those questions were “2013 or earlier”, “20142019”, and “2020”. The answers to each question were assigned points to
create a composite score representing the dependent variable. Each
department was scored according to the following scale: One point if the
department already implemented the action, a half-point if the department plans
to implement the action or is in the process, and zero points if the department
has not implemented the action. For the timing of the implementation, the
following scale was used: One point for 2020, two points for 2014-2019, and
three points for 2013 or earlier.
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Table 2. Dependent Variable Questions
Question
Does your department have a body camera program?
Does your department use social media for community
engagement?
Does your department post policies and procedures
online?
Does your department post crime stats online?
Does your department publish statistics online about
use of force incidents?
Is your department mandating procedural justice training
for officers?

Possible Responses
Yes Planning on
implementing
Yes Planning on
implementing
Yes Planning on
implementing
Yes Planning on
implementing
Yes Planning on
implementing
Yes Planning on
implementing

No
No
No
No
No
No

Is your department mandating de-escalation training for
officers (Does not include the mandate by the State of
Missouri from October 2020)?
Does your department mandate wellness training for
officers?

Yes

Planning on
implementing

No

Yes

Planning on
implementing

No

Does your department have a program focused on
officer-youth interaction within the community other than
D.A.R.E. and S.R.O.s?

Yes

Planning on
implementing

No

Does your department have an officer wellness program
(a program for ensuring the mental, emotional, and
physical health of employees) with at least one
dedicated employee to run the program?
Does your department have programs to provide
alternatives to arrest or other diversion programs (e.g.,
C.I.T)?

Yes

Planning on
implementing

No

Yes

Planning on
implementing

No
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Does your department have search and seizure
procedures related to L.G.B.T.Q. and transgender
citizens?

Yes

Planning on
implementing

No

Does your department have a citizen advisory board for
input on policies and oversight? For example, a board
specifically to advise on community relations, but not for
oversight of complaints.

Yes

Planning on
implementing

No

Does your department have a civilian review board? For
example, a board that is responsible for reviewing
complaints on officers and the discipline of department
employees.

Yes

Planning on
implementing

No

Does your department have policies, procedures, or
formal plan to recruit more applicants that are
representative of the community in terms of race,
ethnicity, or gender?
Does your department participate in a national database
tracking use of force (e.g., F.B.I., Center for Policing
Equity)?

Yes

Planning on
implementing

No

Yes

Planning on
implementing

No

Does your department report a display of a firearm as a
use of force?

Yes

Planning on
implementing

No

Does your department collect data on pedestrian stops
other than regular call for service information? For
example, collecting the perceived race and age of a
citizen and whether a search was conducted.

Yes

Planning on
implementing

No

Does your department have an early warning system to
detect patterns of misconduct or problematic behavior in
officers?
Does your department require written waivers for all
consent searches?

Yes

Planning on
implementing

No

Yes

Planning on
implementing

No

Does your department prohibit the use of misdemeanor
“wanteds” (e.g., entering an arrest teletype based on
only an officer’s authority)?

Yes

Planning on
implementing

No

The answers to each item were assigned points to create a composite
score representing the dependent variable. Scoring the departments in this
way provides a single score representing the reform efforts of each department.
The score assesses the amount and timing of the reform. Rather than just
asking if a policy or practice was implemented, adding the time frame provides
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a dimension of timing to the reform efforts. Earlier reform efforts are more
impactful than current or impending efforts. The score for a department equals
the status of the policy (Yes, Planning on implementing and No) plus the timing
(2013 or earlier, 2014-2019, and 2020), summed across all items in the survey.
A body camera implementation can serve as an example. If a department has
no body cameras, they receive zero points. The calculation and rationale are
straightforward; they have not implemented any reform in this regard. Another
example would be a department that implemented body cameras before 2013.
In this case, the department receives 4 points toward the final score. One point
for the policy and three points for the timing. The same process is used for all
items in the survey and summed to create a single score for each department.
The independent variables comprise a combination of responses from
the survey similar to the dependent variable. A section of the survey asked the
respondent about influences on the department. The questions were
constructed with Likert scale responses and sought to determine the degree to
which each influence from institutional theory impacted the respective
departments. For example, a set of questions asked about the influence of
specific professional organizations such as the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s National Academy, while others asked whether the department
was influenced by specific community organizations or elected officials. The
Likert scale was formatted on a 5-point scale with the following response
options: Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither Agree nor Disagree, Disagree, Strongly
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Disagree. The responses were then transformed to a numerical score of 5 to 1,
following the same direction as the text responses. The items assessing the
independent variable were summed for each category representing the
dimension of institutional theory they were gauging. For example, three items
from the survey theoretically represented the mimetic dimension of institutional
theory. The items in the mimetic group were summed to give a score for that
dimension. For example, a department answering the three items for the
mimetic dimension with a score of three would have a score of nine for that
dimension. Table 3 shows the questions for the independent variables.
Table 3. Items for Independent
Variables
Mimetic Influence
My department looks to other
police departments near our
jurisdiction for best practices.
My department looks to other
organizations (businesses,
schools, non-profits) for best
practices.
My department has specific
organizations to use for best
practices (e.g., specific police
departments used to guide
policies and operations).
Normative Influence
My department encourages
attendance at local
professional association
meetings (SLAPCA, FBINA,
etc.).

Scale
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree

Strongly
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree

Strongly
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree

Strongly
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree
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My department encourages
employees to obtain
leadership roles within the
local professional
associations.
My department is influenced
by the Commission on the
Accreditation of Law
Enforcement Agencies
(CALEA).
My department is influenced
by the Missouri Police Chiefs’
Association.
My department sends
employees to the Senior
Management Institute of
Policing (SMIP) training.
My department sends
employees to the FBINA
training.
My department sends
employees to the
Northwestern Police
Command School.
My department is influenced
by the National Organization
of Black Law Enforcement
Professionals (NOBLE).
My department is influenced
by the Police Executive
Research Forum (PERF).
.
Pro-Reform Coercive
Influences from Sovereigns
My department regularly
applies for grants from
external sources.

Strongly
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree

Strongly
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree

Strongly
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree

Strongly
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree

Strongly
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree

Strongly
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree

Strongly
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree
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My department is influenced
by local elected officials to
enact police reform.
My department is influenced
by local community groups
such as churches, schools,
and non-profit organizations to
enact police reform.
My department is influenced
by local businesses to enact
police reform.
My department is influenced
by state or national elected
officials to enact police reform.

Strongly
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree

Strongly
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree
Strongly
Strongly
Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree

Analytical Strategy
Using the reform scores as the dependent variable and the summed
scores for each dimension of institutional theory, I created a regression model
to predict the scores on the reform scale. The regression model tests the
hypotheses discussed earlier. Using a regression model enables me to
determine what factors or independent variables contribute to enacting reform
within the police departments. Additionally, I was able to control for specific
influences on the model using control variables.
Interviews
In conjunction with sending the survey to police officials, I interviewed the
chiefs of several of the departments surveyed. The survey contained an item
asking the respondents if an official from the department was willing to be
interviewed. The purpose of the interviews was to give context for the answers
to the survey questions. Many police officials gave insight into why they were

83

able to enact change or what prevented them from enacting change. I use the
quotes and examples from the interviews in the body of the dissertation to add
depth to the analysis and add to the understanding of the problem. The
interviews were coded using NVivo software to develop themes from the
interviews to add to the findings of the research. NVivo is widely used to take
unstructured data in the form of transcripts or speech and perform content
analysis (AlYahmady and Al Abri 2013; Leech and Onwuegbuzie 2011; Wong
2008). The interview transcripts were uploaded into the software and analyzed
with queries native to NVivo and then coded with NVivo. The coding process
consisted of carefully reading the text and making determinations about the
theme expressed in the passage. The result of this process can be the
discovery of new or unexpected findings from the data.
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Chapter 4: Quantitative Results
In this chapter I discuss the quantitative results of the research. I first
describe the results of the survey by looking at the characteristics of
departments responding versus those not responding. I then review the survey
responses making up the dependent variable of a policy reform score. The
survey results comprising the independent variable are also be examined within
the chapter. Finally, the regression model used to test the hypotheses is
examined.
Twenty-five departments within St. Louis County responded to the
survey. With 53 departments within St. Louis County, the response rate was
forty-seven percent. The profile of the departments that responded was
different from those that did not respond. The departments responding to the
survey were on average bigger, policing more affluent communities with lower
crime rates. For example, of the departments responding, the average number
of officers was 39 whereas the average number of officers for non-responding
departments was 23. The number of officers is often a proxy for the population
of a city, and this appears to be the case as the average city population for
responding cities was 15,396 and only 8,220 for non-responding cities. The
average median income for the responding cities was $85,439 while the median
for the non-responding cities was $62,866. Finally, the violent crime rate for the
responding cities 3.1 per 100,000 residents while the rate for non-responding
cities was 5.0. All of these differences except for the violent crime rates were
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statistically significant at the .05 level using a chi-square test. Of course, these
findings may warrant caution when generalizing the findings from the research.
The differences between the responding and non-responding
departments created another important research question. Could a model be
created to explain the differences between the responding and non-responding
departments? One final difference between the responding and nonresponding cities was CALEA accreditation. Of the 25 departments responding
to the survey, 14 were CALEA accredited. The differences between the
accreditation status of the responding and non-responding department were
statistically significant at the .05 level using a chi-square test. I created a
regression model testing whether CALEA accreditation predicted responses to
the survey. The logic is that CALEA accreditation mandates departments to
collect and disseminate information on policies, practices, and statistics on dayto-day operations. Many of the issues on the survey for this research could be
easily answered if a department has achieved CALEA accreditation.
Completing the survey would be consistent with the idea of transparency and
professionalism fostered by CALEA accreditation. From the perspective of
institutional theory, CALEA accreditation would signal influence from normative
pressure. The regression model results indicate that CALEA accredited
departments were more than one and a half times more likely to respond to the
survey. The results were statistically significant at the .05 alpha level. Table 4
shows the output of the regression model.
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Table 4. Model Results
Dependent variable:
Response to Survey
CALEA

1.539**
p = 0.049

Violent Crime Rate

0.001
p = 0.994

Total Officers

0.00001
p = 0.194

Median Income

0.020
p = 0.271

Constant

-2.252*
p = 0.094

Observations
Log Likelihood
Akaike Inf. Crit.
Note:

51
-28.156
66.312
*p<0.1**p<0.05***p<0.01

Knowing that CALEA accreditation is associated with survey response,
holding other variables constant, demonstrates the possible influence of the
accreditation. It is unknown if those departments are conditioned by CALEA to
be forthcoming with information about themselves or those departments would
have promoted transparency regardless of the accreditation. Regardless, the
accreditation status does have a strong relationship with survey response.
Besides the obvious benefits of accreditation, these results suggest that CALEA
accreditation may create conditions where departments demonstrate greater
transparency and professionalism.
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Looking at the descriptive results of the survey responses provides
insight into the reform efforts and the influences of the departments responding
to the survey. As discussed in the methods section, a composite variable that
comprised all reform measures and the timing of the reform effort was created
to assess the scale of progressive reform in one variable. The variable, called
reform score, is a single number that represents the reform of a department
with higher scores equaling greater reform. The variable is also the primary
dependent variable that I am interested in modeling. For that variable and of
the departments responding, the scores ranged from 31 to 61.50 with a mean
score of 40.27 and a median of 39.75. Figure 3 shows a box plot of the scores.
From the box plot, one can see that there are several outliers with high reform
scores.
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Figure 3

Looking at the descriptive statistics of the policy changes reported
through the survey, it does appear that in the years following 2014, more
change occurred than before 2014. For all of the items that changed, 73
percent of the change occurred after 2013. Several specific categories are
notable. For the policies listed below, most of them occurred after 2013. The
percentage indicates the proportion of changes taking place after 2013.
•

Body cameras – 100%

•

Social media use – 75%
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•

Posting policies online – 100%

•

Posting crime statistics online – 56%

•

Posting use of force statistics online – 86%

•

Procedural justice training – 100%

•

De-escalation training – 96%

•

Wellness training – 83%

•

Wellness program implementation – 86%

•

LGBQ search policy – 92%

•

Advisory board – 55%

•

Recruiting program implementation – 80%

•

Use of Force database – 92%

•

Reporting display of weapon – 56%

•

Early warning system – 61%

•

Misdemeanor wanted prohibition – 67%

The scores from the individual survey questions also provide a wealth of
information about reform concerning specific policies. For example, 72 percent
of the departments responding to the survey reported having body cameras,
with nearly three quarters of those departments implementing them since 2014.
The reform efforts most commonly found within the departments were the use
of social media (96%), diversion programs (92%), and early warning systems
(92%).
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The high prevalence of social media use is not surprising given many
platforms ease of use and low cost. A Facebook account is free to start and
considering that the public are eager consumers of social media and little to no
training is involved in using it, the widespread adoption of it could be expected.
Many departments throughout the United States have their own Facebook page
or participate in the NextDoor app that is focused on crime and safety issues
within neighborhoods.
Diversion programs refer to policies and practices that allow certain
individuals to circumvent the traditional criminal justice system. The most
popular one in the St. Louis area is the Crisis Intervention Team or CIT. CIT
focuses on aiding individuals experiencing a mental health crisis. Many times,
the behavior of those individuals could be classified as a low-level crime such
as peace disturbance or trespassing. The CIT program works by training
officers to recognize individuals in a mental health crisis, de-escalate the
situation, and then find assistance for the mental health issue rather than a
ticket or arrest. In some cases, an individual may have to be arrested, but still
have the option to have their case adjudicated in a mental health court. The
program started in Memphis, TN and is now common throughout the United
States in some form. The CIT program in the St. Louis region was started by
the St. Louis County Police Department in 2003 and quickly spread to other
county departments. The program is free for participants and therefore it is no
surprise that it is so pervasive with 96 percent of responding departments
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indicating they use the program. While not the topic of this research, the
expansion of the CIT program could be considered an example of mimetic
influence with department looking to other departments for ideas and programs.
The early warning system program that 92 percent of departments
indicated they use is a program or policy that systematically identifies officers
who exhibit patterns of misconduct or above average rates of using force,
pursuits, or complaints. The intent of these programs is to determine which
officers show patterns of unwanted behavior and then ideally, prevent tragic
events such as officer involved shootings or even more mundane things like
officers’ acting rudely toward citizens. In the aftermath of the death of George
Floyd, many questioned how Derek Chauvin could have had 19 complaints yet
still worked as an officer. In theory, an early warning system could pick up on a
pattern if the behavior was contemporaneous. Speaking in general terms, most
early warning systems use basic logic and counts to determine if an officer is at
risk for further bad behavior. For example, an officer has three complaints within
a year may be flagged for review. Although the survey did not set parameters
for the type of early intervention system, by definition it could be anything from a
database with machine learning algorithms running on it to a paper ledger in
smaller departments.
The items with the lowest implementation according to survey results
were having a citizen review board (8%), posting use of force statistics online
(28%), and having a wellness program (28%). These findings are not surprising

92

given that most of these initiatives are new and not widely adopted throughout
the United States. Citizen review boards come in various configurations with
most of them having a core mission of providing oversight for the behavior of
officers. At the one end of the spectrum, some cities allow the review board to
take complaints directly and investigate the complaints while others only
passively review cases. Review boards in the traditional form are not common
the St. Louis area. While the concept is promising, the implementation of them
can be burdensome with problems of scope and authority. This is reflected in
the small number identified by the survey.
Posting use of force statistics online for public consumption is also a new
trend in policing. Some have said that the administrative data in policing is an
untapped source of information that the public is only beginning to consume
(Ferguson 2017). Reporting use of force data refers to reporting the number of
uses of Taser uses, firearms, or perhaps vehicle pursuits. Most departments
capture and document these events in some manner whether it is in an Excel
spreadsheet or popular commercial database application such as IAPro. Large
departments in the United States will also publish these statistics to the public
on their website. For example, the Dallas Police Department has a data rich
webpage dedicated to data on officer involved shootings
(https://dallaspolice.net/ois/ois). A serious problem with the use of force data
collection and reporting is a lack of standardization. The definitions of what
constitutes a “use of force” varies by department and because of this, any
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comparison between departments becomes futile in many cases. The lack of
comparisons is problematic for the public. Without knowing how to compare
departments, it becomes hard to judge the performance of a department let
alone individual officers on the department. Through professional experience, I
have noted that many police leaders are reluctant to voluntarily publish online
use of force statistics because of possible scrutiny. The belief is that
publishing the data opens the department up to critics. For all these reasons, it
is no surprise that the departments indicating they publish crime statistics online
is low.
The last item that was uncommon among the responding departments
was the presence of a wellness program. Just as mental health has been
recognized as crucial health factor in the general population, awareness of its
detrimental effects is more commonplace in policing. Although research on
stress in policing and the impact it has on officers’ physical health has been
studied for decades, the research on policing’s impact on mental health has just
recently started to increase. Some departments have taken a very proactive
approach to addressing the mental health of officers. Departments such as
Indianapolis Police Department and the San Diego Police Department were
some of the first departments to create wellness units staffed by several
employees. These wellness units proactively seek out ways to improve the
mental health of employees on their respective departments. The return on
investment for larger departments appears favorable as these department can
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influence large numbers of officers with only a few staff members dedicated to a
wellness program. In contrast, smaller departments may find the investment in
one officer to be a costly investment. Because most of the departments
surveyed were smaller, especially in comparison to Indianapolis and San Diego,
it is no surprise that wellness programs are uncommon.
The other half of the survey asked the respondents about the influence
of various groups and organizations. The items were constructed to assess the
dimensions of institutional theory. Recall that those dimensions are mimetic,
normative, and coercive. The responses to those items serve as the
independent variables for the research. The survey responses created three
scores to represent each dimension of institutional theory. Table 5 shows the
mean scores for each survey item organized by the dimension. The survey
item with the highest mean values are local associations for the memetic
dimension, CALEA for the normative dimension, and grants for the coercive
dimension. The dimension with the highest mean score overall was the mimetic
dimension with a mean of 4.06. The coercive dimension had the lowest mean
value at 3.11. The results for each item are shown in Table 5.
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Table 5

Mean Value of Independent Variables (Range = 1-5)
Mimetic

Normative

Coercive

Other Depts

3.96 Leadership

4.13

Grants

3.96

Other Orgs

3.38 CALEA

4.50

Local Elected

2.83

Specific Depts

4.21 MPCA

3.96

Community
Groups

3.13

SMIP

2.67

Businesses

2.92

FBINA

4.38

National Officials

3.21

Northwestern

2.88

Local Enforce

3.29

NOBLE

3.08

Labor Discretion

2.79

PERF

3.29

Officer Enforce

3.17

Local
Associations

4.75

Labor General

2.67

Figure 4 shows the distribution for each dimension of institutional theory
which serve as the independent variables for the regression model. The box
plots visually show that the values for the mimetic dimension have the least
variance among the variables. Table 6 shows the corresponding values from
the box plot while Figure 5 shows a correlation matrix for the variables. As
shown in the correlation matrix, the dimensions have little correlation.
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Figure 4

Table 6

Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev. Min

Pctl. 25 Pctl. 75 Max

Coercive

24

27.958

5.835

18

24.75

30.25

44

Mimetic

24

11.542

2.126

7

10.75

13

15

Normative

24

33.625

4.009

23

31.75

36.25

41
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Figure 5

Hypothesis Testing
To test the hypotheses, I created a regression model using the variables
from the survey results. This section discusses the models and the results. In
a later chapter, I discuss the implication of the findings. All models were
created using the R Programming language. The diagnostics for the models
are found in Appendix B. Once again, the three hypotheses are as follows:
1. Departments with greater normative influence will enact more change.
2. Department with greater mimetic influence will enact more change.
3. Departments with greater coercive influence will enact more change.
The equation form of the model is as follows:

𝑦! = 𝛽" + 𝛽$ 𝑥$! + 𝛽% 𝑥%! + 𝛽& 𝑥&! + 𝜖
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The interpretation of the model is that the variation in the dependent
variable is determined by the normative influence score, the mimetic influence
score, the coercive influence score, and the error term. The model also
included several control variables. Those control variables are: The violent
crime rate, total officers on the department, and the median income of the city.
The rationale for the control variables is to account for the influence of those
factors in the model.
The first control variable is the violent crime rate. The crime rate was
determined by gathering the 2018 Uniform Crime Statistics from the Missouri
State Highway Patrol’s crime data webpage. The violent crime rate is a control
variable because it may impact a department’s ability or desire to reform.
Researchers such as Klinger (1997) postulate that elevated crime levels can
alter the manner in which police departments manage work wherein they
prioritize effort based on crime levels. Wilson (2000) also theorizes that
“operators” in government agencies are primarily concerned with immediate
environmental concerns such as caseloads or 911 calls for services. The
concern with environmental factors makes it difficult for organizations to change
practices or implement initiatives. For these reasons, I believe that high violent
crime rates may impact the capacity for change because of the resources they
demand.
The number of officers is the second control variable. The size of a
department (as measured by the number of officers) could impact the ability to
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enact reform. Variation in department size may alter reform efforts. For
example, smaller departments may have more difficulty implementing body
cameras because of the initial outlay of capital funds. Larger departments may
find it harder to implement policies because of bureaucratic overhead. The
variable is added to account for the influence of department size.
The median income is the final control variable. The median income of a
city could influence reform efforts by having more funding for reform programs
or initiatives. By adding the variables as a control, that influence can be
accounted for to see a more accurate representation of the independent
variables. The results of the model are shown in Table 7 and graphical
representation of the model and the strength of the coefficients is shown in
Figure 6.
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Table 7. Model Results
Dependent variable:
Reform Score
Normative Score

0.373
p = 0.286
1.477**

Mimetic Score

p = 0.045
Coercive Score

0.220
p = 0.376

Violent Crime Rate

0.165
p = 0.747
0.174***

Total Officers

p = 0.008
Median Income

0.00002
p = 0.761

Constant

-4.351
p = 0.683

Observations

23

R2

0.671

Adjusted R2

0.548

Residual Std. Error
F Statistic
Note:

5.267 (df = 16)
5.438*** (df = 6; 16)
*p<0.1**p<0.05***p<0.01
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Figure 6

The model produced one statistically significant finding along with other
findings that are consistent with the hypotheses. Those results are discussed in
the following paragraphs. The adjusted R-squared for the model is .55. The
model accounted for over half of the variation in the dependent variable. To test
the assumptions of the model, I conducted several tests and checks using R
Programming. The R package, gvlma, which stands for Global Validation of
Linear Model Assumptions was used to check five assumptions of the model
(Peña and Slate 2006). The package iterates through the model object in R and
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returns a straightforward output of whether the assumption is met or not. Table
8 shows the results of the checks.
Table 8

GVLMA Diagnostics
Check
Global Stat

Value
5.98291

p-value
0.20043

Skewness

1.30819

0.25272

Kurtosis

1.08965

0.29655

Link Function

3.55173

0.05948

Heteroscedasticity

0.03335

0.8551

Decision
Assumptions
acceptable.
Assumptions
acceptable.
Assumptions
acceptable.
Assumptions
acceptable.
Assumptions
acceptable.

The global stat checks the linear relationship between the independent and
dependent variables to see if they are linear. The skewness and kurtosis check
examine the normality of the distribution of residuals. The link function checks
to see if the dependent variable is continuous. The heteroscedasticity check
examines the error variance to determine if its random. The tables shows that
the model passed all of the checks. A graphical representation of the checks is
shown in Appendix B. To further check the model, I ran several more tests with
other packages in R. Some of the tests were redundant to those in the gvlma
battery but offered more technical details. The results of those tests were
consistent with the gvlma tests and found in Appendix B.
Hypothesis one states that departments with greater normative influence
will enact more change. Recall that normative pressure takes the form of
pressure or influence from professional groups and peers to enact new policies.
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In terms of progressive reform, many of professional groups on the national
level such as PERF or CALEA promote progressive policy positions. The
results from the regression model are inconclusive. The coefficient for the
normative variable is 0.37. The finding is in the direction the hypothesis would
predict, but not statistically significant with a p-value of 0.29. The small sample
size limits the ability to detect small effects in the model.
Hypothesis two states that departments with greater mimetic influence
will enact more change. Mimetic influence is manifested when a department
looks to another department for guidance on how to proceed by emulating what
the other departments have done. The influence can be especially prevalent
during times of uncertainty or in novel situations. The hypothesis is supported
from the results of the model. The mimetic influence independent variable has
a coefficient of 1.48 meaning that for every one unit increase in the mimetic
influence score, the reform score increases 1.48 points. The results are
statistically significant at the .05 level with a p-value of 0.04.
The third hypothesis states that departments with greater coercive
influence will enact more change. The coercive influence may originate from
many sources and typically involves the use of formal authority to sanction or
penalize a department. For example, cutting funding would be coercive
pressure. Just as with hypothesis one, the results from the model are
inconclusive. The coefficient for the coercive independent variable was 0.22.
The results, however, were not statistically significant with a p-value of 0.38. As
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with the results above, the small sample size limits the ability to detect small
effects.
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Chapter 5: Qualitative Results
As the last survey responses were coming in, I started interviewing police
chiefs. The purpose of the interviews was to add context to the quantitative data
and explore the dimensions of institutional theory with another method. A total
of seven chiefs indicated they were willing to be interviewed. Five chiefs from
local departments were interviewed based on their representation of different
size and character of departments. All but one of the interviews were done over
Zoom with the one exception done over the phone. The interviews were an
hour in length. I did not record the interviews, but rather took detailed notes as
the interviews transpired. All chiefs interviewed were very forthcoming and
candid about their views and experiences as not only a chief, but a police
professional over the years. The chiefs interviewed represented average size
departments in St. Louis County. The departments represented in the
interviews had an average of 47 officers with a diverse population served.
Some of the Chiefs served affluent communities while others served working
class and poor communities. The interviews were structured around a core set
of questions with the specific topics varying depending on the issues at each
department. I created the questions aimed at determining what influenced the
chiefs to make change. I constructed the questions to address the dimensions
of institutional theory. The following is a list of possible topics covered in each
interview:
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1. When do you feel the pressure to reform and change has been the
greatest?
2. Was there one point that highlighted the pressure to change?
3. What are some examples of policies that you have changed in the last
seven years?
4. What are some of the obstacles to making changes?
5. Were there changes that you wanted but could not enact? If so, what
were the reasons for not implementing the change?
6. How did unions impact your implementation of policies?
7. What role did community groups or business groups play in enacting
change?
8. If these groups did play a role in the change, what was the role? Please
explain?
9. How exactly did they influence your department? Was it done in a
private manner or was it public pressure? Provide examples.
10. Do you feel that the reforms desired by many groups actually help
police operations? If they don’t, what value do they have?
11. What role does the influence of professional organizations play in
reform?
12. Do you consider these groups a resource when enacting change?
13. Do you think the protests and call for change made a difference in terms
of change.
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Several themes emerged from the interviews of police chiefs. The first
theme was the absence of direct pressure to change from local elected officials.
None of the chiefs acknowledged direct and strong pressure from mayors, city
councils, city managers, or community groups. They discussed some questions
from these individuals over specific policies or practices. For example, one
chief was questioned by a commission on traffic stop statistics related to the
race of drivers. There was no mention of recommendations or directives from
the group to change practices. Another chief discussed questioning by a
community group after the arrest of several juveniles at a park. The chief met
with the group but did not indicate the group gave a pointed request to make
changes. None of the chiefs would admit they had direct ultimatums or
direction to make changes. In terms of institutional theory, there was a lack of a
direct coercive dimension according to the chiefs in these interviews.
The second theme emerging from the interviews centered around
indirect pressure of scrutiny of other departments. All of the chiefs were very
aware of the criticisms of either Ferguson in 2014 or the Minneapolis Police in
2020. Four of the five chiefs interviewed discussed thinking through how their
own department would fair if put under the same scrutiny. One of the chiefs
interviewed talked about looking at specific policies that outside groups were
reviewing with the Ferguson Police Department. He described efforts to make
sure officer hiring was representative of the community. One area of concern
about the Ferguson police department was the lack of diversity within its ranks.
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He did this by working with his elected officials to change an ordinance allowing
individuals to be hired without police experience. The modification of the law
opened up the applicant pool for the department. He reported that minority
hiring has increased since the change. Around the same time as the hiring
changes, he implemented more leadership training for groups of officers that
had traditionally not been promoted. Again, this was a broad effort to shore-up
any weaknesses in personnel practices that would hypothetically be exposed if
his department were to face the same scrutiny as the Ferguson Police
Department.
The theme of using professional organizations was strong in four of the
five interviews. The chiefs described using professional organizations such as
SLAPCA, IACP, and the FBI NA as resources for information and policy
guidance. The chiefs would use SLAPCA to inform them on local issues as one
would expect and used the national organizations as a way to learn about
issues throughout the nation that could impact them at some point. For
example, one chief was in the process of rethinking policies on gender specific
grooming standards. Traditionally, police departments have standards for hair
length and jewelry among other categories based on an officer’s gender. The
traditional gender-based standards are being reconsidered by some
departments in other parts of the country as traditional norms are changing.
One chief described the professional connections he had with other chiefs from
a professional organization. To him, these connections were valuable because
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he could use the other chiefs as a resource for policy ideas. These chiefs
spoke a lot about the effectiveness of professional organizations in promoting
professional norms and values. Several of the chiefs spoke highly of CALEA
accreditation processes in general. One chief stated, “Accreditation says a lot
about a department.” Other chiefs talked about how the accreditation process
makes transparency easier and conditions the department to be open with
information on their operations. Three of the chiefs had worked directly with
their department’s accreditation process in the past and spoke highly of the
benefits of accreditation.
Another theme from the interviews was the nebulous concept of doing
the “right thing”. Nearly all of the chiefs spoke about making a choice because
it was the right thing to do. For example, the chief making the hiring practice
changes said he did it in part because it was the right thing to do. Other chiefs
made similar statements. One chief described how he does not do something
just because an outside group or elected official wants him to do something, he
does it because it is the right thing to do. The chiefs described their decisions
as not a direct result of outside pressure, but rather motivated by the sense of
what was right in a given situation. The chiefs seemed to rely on an internal
sense of what is right and wrong. It appears that the chiefs are taking signals
from the environment and then viewing them from the lens of what is right.
Based on their professional view of what is right, they make a choice.
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The final theme I discerned from the interviews concerned the lack of
union pressure. Police unions are often considered an obstacle to reform and
thought to protect troubled officers from culpability (Greenhouse 2020;
Friedersdorf 2021; 2014; Scheiber, Stockman, and Goodman 2020). Contrary
to the notion of strong union pressure, these chiefs reported a minimal, yet
collaborative relationship with their respective unions. Several of the chiefs
worked with the collective bargaining agreements but stated that the unions
were primarily interested in pay and benefits rather than day-to-day policies.
One chief reported a higher frequency of policy discussions with his officers’
union. He did not describe the discussions as adversarial, just more frequent
and with higher engagement. That chief used the relationship as a way to gain
more buy in for the policies he desired. Rather than just implementing a policy
without union discussions, the chief would try to gain consensus on policies with
the union even though he was under no contractual obligation to do so. He
reported that doing this made the implementation of policies easier and more
effective. The overall theme from the interviews was that union pressure was
minimal for these departments. Of course, they are smaller than where union
pressure has been reported such the NYPD and Minneapolis, MN Police
Departments.
I used the NVivo software to analyze the interviews. One of the native
queries in NVivo is a word frequency count. The query was the first type of
analysis I ran on the transcript data to get an indication of the common words
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from the transcripts. The most frequent word used was “change” with a count
of 39.
Coding the transcripts with NVivo provided more insights. According to
Harding, coding is a method to examine commonalities in data and to identify
similarities between cases (2015). I used an apriori method of coding where I
used the dimensions of institutional theory as the framework for the codes.
Using the aprori codes allows me to compare the qualitative findings to the
quantitative interview results. The findings from coding brought forward new
perspectives that contrasted the quantitative data.
The coding results of the interviews put emphasis on the coercive
dimension of institutional theory. The coercive dimension had the most coding
references among the interviews with 17. The normative dimension was
referenced 12 times and the mimetic dimension six times. These results are a
reversal of the survey results where the mimetic dimension had the most
influence. The coding results highlighted many phrases where a chief
discussed either exploring changes or actually making changes because a
group questioned the department or an official government entity such as a
commission made an official inquiry into how the department operates. These
interactions represent the coercive element of institutional theory. For example,
one chief described revising a policy after a local commission made inquiries
about department practices. The commission had the authority of the local
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government to make suggestions for changes. The inference can be made that
the commission used its official power to initiate potential changes.
Many of the chiefs interviewed acknowledged either direct or indirect
scrutiny of their department by community groups or at least one elected official
or government body. Many of the chiefs stated that they made changes or
were exploring or enacting changes because it was the “right thing” to do. The
chain of events seems more obvious when looking at the overall pattern. The
departments were scrutinized or questioned by an outside group and the
reaction was to explore or make changes. The reason given for making the
change was that it was the right thing to do or motivated by a professional
norm. I believe the notion of the right thing to do is demonstrating the
normative dimension of institutional theory. A department experiences scrutiny,
the chief relies on professional norms to recognize the need for change and
may see other departments making changes.

Chapter 6: Discussion and Recommendations
Did the death of Michael Brown change policing in St. Louis County? If
so, what were the mechanisms of change? Those are the questions I have
sought to answer with this research. The evidence from this research
demonstrates that within the departments responding to the survey, some
progressive reform occurred. Further, the reform is associated with the mimetic
dimension of institutional theory. In the following paragraphs, I review the
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evidence to support my assertions and, in the process, review the research I
conducted.
The results of the survey and the interviews provides evidence that many
departments did change after the death of Michael Brown. Many departments
made changes that could be interpreted as progressive reform in the years after
2014. Those changes include body cameras, officer wellness programs, and
greater transparency for policies. Most of those changes were made after
2013. The interviews provided context for those changes by providing visibility
into the decision-making process for chief of police. The interviews showed
how the chiefs were open to hearing criticism and relied heavily on a sense of
what was right in a given situation.
The implication of these findings is that most of the change reported
occurred after the death of Michael Brown. Of course, my research does not
have a control group where I can compare a region that did not have a Michael
Brown incident. It seems unlikely that all these changes would have occurred
at the same pace without the pressure created from the death of Michael
Brown. Only one Ferguson Police Department exists. The spotlight of the
media was on Ferguson for their policing practices leading up to the death of
Brown and then on the St. Louis County Police Department for their handling of
the investigation and protests. Despite the direct and persistent attention to
those two departments, the other nearby departments took notice. The timing
of the policy changes is one piece of evidence for this with the other being the
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interviews with police chiefs. All of the police chiefs acknowledged the pressure
and scrutiny from the Brown death. The chiefs interviewed did not dismiss the
scrutiny as misguided or not relevant to them. They also acknowledged the
intense scrutiny following the death of George Floyd. Instead of dismissing
these incidents as someone else’s problem, they internalized the scrutiny and
asked hard questions of themselves. It appears that many of those chiefs and
others acted upon the pressure in the environment.
The next question I posed was how that change occurred. My research
used institutional theory to answer that question. If the policing institution in
America exists solely to apprehend and prosecute criminals, then the concerns
of transparency with policies and governance would be secondary to the
technical issues of crime control. For example, why does a department have an
interest in posting its policies online or hiring a police force that reflects the
community if they are only worried about crime control? Of course, one could
argue that online policies and a diverse force does help with crime control
indirectly by increasing the trust in the police and thereby making citizens more
likely to help the police. However, if the police were extraordinarily effective by
technical standards, they would solve many more crimes and not need to
increase trust. The reality is that the police, much like the education system,
are not always perfect, far from it when faced with overwhelming demand and a
lack of resources. Schools can have low reading and math scores while the
police can see crime rates soar. Rather than judging the police on the crime
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rates alone, the public and sovereigns look to other ways to assess the
performance of police department. The technical matters of crime control are
decoupled from the evaluation of the police. What matters is whether the
sovereigns are satisfied so resources continue to flow.
To investigate the degree to which sovereigns influenced the
departments, I used the survey results as variables in a regression model. The
regression model found that departments influenced by mimetic pressure were
more likely to enact change. Stated another way, departments looking to other
departments for an example of action or strategy were more likely to make
progressive reform. The regression model found these results to be statistically
significant, thus the supporting the first hypothesis.
I researched another important influence on departments to make
progressive reform. Normative pressure from professional norms and explicit
policy positions from professional organizations may have an impact on making
change within the departments responding to the survey. The regression model
included an independent variable representing normative influence. The
variable was shown to have the expected relationship with the dependent
variable but was not statistically significant. The results were likely impacted by
the low power of the model. The interviews of the chiefs provided consistent
support for normative influence. The chiefs spoke at length about doing the
“right thing” when making decisions. They stated that the right thing is not
necessarily what an elected official or community group wanted, but rather what
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was best in their view. The chiefs also spoke at length about the role of
professional organizations. The chiefs stated that they relied upon the local and
national organizations to guide them on policy positions and keep them aware
of trends in law enforcement.
These findings paint a picture of at least some chiefs and departments
being open and receptive to the information and influence of professional
organizations such as SLAPCA, PERF, and CALEA. The findings are
encouraging for those outside of departments such as community members or
elected officials. The takeaway would be to encourage the participation in
professional organizations as a means or path to enact more reform. By
participating in these organizations and information networks, the chiefs are
opening their organization to the external environment rather than allowing it to
become inward focused and oblivious to the changing world.
A final finding to discuss that informs the literature and the current
narrative on policing in the United States is the role of unions. As stated in
earlier sections of the research, unions have been identified in the research and
by reformers as an impediment to holding officers accountable and challenging
the status quo in policing. It is clear that in most circumstances, police unions
represent the rights of the officers as their mission would dictate. My research
breaks from the mainstream narrative concerning police unions. Of the
departments responding to the survey, the influence of labor organization was
scored as one of the least powerful sources of influences. These quantitative
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findings were underscored during the interviews with the police chiefs. All of
them recognized the presence of a union and even collective bargaining
agreements, but not one said the unions were exerting substantial, ongoing
pressure for changes or to maintain the status quo. One might argue that these
findings come directly from the management side of labor relations and the
chiefs downplay the importance of unions. Conversely, one could argue that
the chief could just as easily argue that they are stymied by their unions and
unable to carry out their agendas because of the unions. A final consideration
is to recognize the relatively small size of the departments in this research and
the commensurate small size of the unions. The small influence of unions in
this research may be due to the unions small size and the strong influence
referred to by researchers and in media accounts may come from larger, more
powerful unions with memberships much greater in size.
Theoretical Implications of the Research
Institutional theory has been discussed at-length in this research. I have
shown evidence of it predicting reform efforts of police departments. More
influence from professional organizations and more normative influence are
strong predictors of reform efforts. It is possible the theory could be used to
predict the reform efforts of different police departments. Perhaps more
importantly, the theory could be used to improve efforts to change police
departments. Selecting chiefs with greater professional and community
connections may increase reform efforts. The findings from this research would
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support examining the professional and community ties for police chief
candidates.
The findings from the research did not support coercive influence as
driving change for progressive reform. As reported in the quantitative results
section, the coercive influence independent variable was not statistically
significant in the model. Adding to the lack of evidence was the interviews with
the chiefs. Even when asked directly about the role of elected officials or other
authority bodies, they did not acknowledge them as a factor when making
decisions. As with the other findings, this research is limited to the departments
responding to the surveys.
Recommendations
I now turn to recommendations. The recommendations I make here flow
from the research findings within the context of two decades of professional
experience in law enforcement. As a former practitioner, it is hard to remove
those experiences from any interpretation of the findings. Although that may be
seen as a drawback to my approach and viewpoint, it also is beneficial.
Perhaps more than many industries, policing has a strong culture that can
render even the best ideas ineffectual. A key to successful change is to
understand the history and context of that change so that resistance can be
anticipated. I have tried to be a neutral as possible with the recommendations
with some of them even running contrary to the short-term interests of
practitioners. The changes researched for this research as assumed to be
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beneficial for the communities served and the police departments themselves.
The survey looked at policies and practices that are supported by most, if not
all, prominent professional policing organizations.
The first recommendation is to increase the strength and use of
professional organizations. One of the primary topics discussed in this research
has been the role and influence of professional organizations. The survey and
the interviews both confirmed the prominence of professional organizations in
local departments. The chiefs interviewed leaned upon local professional
organizations and national ones for current information and guidance. The
professional organizations can be different yet important in their own way. In
this section I make recommendations on how to these organizations can be
used to formalize professional norms and key policies.
So far in this research I have mentioned several specific professional
organizations but have discussed them as a group without distinction. The
primary local and national professional organizations serve distinct roles. I will
start with the local organization, SLAPCA. SLAPCA serves a prominent role in
the St. Louis Region by coordinating activities of law enforcement agencies
within several counties and to a lesser extent providing a framework for
standardizing policing practices. The group has an active membership group
with regular meetings. Over the years it has played a key role in shaping
standards and practices in the St. Louis region and assisted in coordinating
large-scale events.
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The final professional organizations are the Police Executive Research
Forum or PERF, the International Association of Chiefs of Police or IACP, and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation National Academy Associates. All of these
organizations advocate for best practices in policing. They are focused on the
executive level of the organization with both producing original research and
publications to guide practitioners in the field. Although the research they
produce would not be considered academic in the traditional sense, they
regularly work with academic experts to produce content for members. PERF
publishes regular white papers on different topics in policing ranging from
human trafficking to the use of police canines. IACP produces white papers as
well and also produces model policies that can guide practitioners in finding the
best practices. These organizations have robust web sites for members with
access to content. The IACP provides a clearinghouse service for policies
where members can go and search through a large database of policies
contributed by members throughout the United States. The database is
extremely helpful when trying to find examples of how other departments are
thinking about specific issues in law enforcement.
CALEA is an accreditation body that was created in the late 1970s as a
way of setting professional standards in policing. The accreditation given by
CALEA is more pervasive in agencies in the south and Midwest of the United
States. The accreditation has differing standards and requirements depending
on the size of the agency and the chosen difficulty of standards. CALEA is
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completely voluntary but serves several purposes for departments willing to
invest the resources in the accreditation. CALEA has the potential to be a
vehicle for standardizing policing in the United States. To some degree it has
already accomplished that end. Departments achieving CALEA accreditation
regardless of where they are located, share common features because of the
CALEA standards. If accreditation could be incentivized more throughout the
United States, greater standardization could take place.
CALEA requires a strong commitment. To be a CALEA accredited
department, a department must commit to the annual fees charged by CALEA
but must also put resources in place to maintain the accreditation. Depending
on the size of the department, this can be whole team of individuals working to
maintain CALEA compliance. CALEA accreditation requires an upfront
investment from the agency. The investment gives departments many benefits
beyond simply the recognition of accreditation. The process of CALEA
accreditation is where most of the benefit is gained. Complying with the CALEA
standards forces departments to review policies and provide evidence or proof
that the policies are being followed. Critics of CALEA will say that showing
proof of one instance of policy compliance is anecdotal and that may be correct,
but if done right, the chief champion CALEA and high standards it strives to
achieve. CALEA is not only a signal to the community of professionalism, but
also as a mechanism to be in a perpetual cycle of reviewing policies and
practices to make policies better. During litigation, policies can play a critical
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role. Departments are better prepared for litigation when they regularly review
policies and can say that their policies are reviewed annually by an outside
organization. Once again, the process that CALEA mandates are just as
important as the actual accreditation. These organizations play a key role in
advancing professionalism in policing.
The second recommendation is for the public to demand higher
standards. All the points raised here are things the community should be asking
the executives at their local departments. The evidence from the interviews of
the chiefs is that consistent questions from the community or groups advocating
from the community can be the impetus for change. The right questions from
the community can uncover deficiencies of policies and practices. In many
cases, policies of departments may go unquestioned for years until a
remarkable event. Many departments may not actively seek to improve policies
because they are unaware of the vulnerabilities of their policies. It is the case
of not having enough knowledge on difficult topics to be aware of the known
vulnerabilities. For example, many smaller departments lack expertise in human
resources events though police departments typically spend over 80 percent of
their budgets on personnel. Without sufficient knowledge of human resources,
departments are operating in a field of legal land mines. The public should ask
hard questions to test the knowledge of departments and expose organizational
weaknesses.
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Citizens and community groups should leverage the media if the
questions go unanswered. The media is effective in spotlighting acute
problems and long-standing problems. Once an issue is circulated in the
media, it is much more likely to gain attention from policy makers at the local,
state, or national level. Recall that this is exactly what occurred with the death
of Michael Brown. It was one of the first events in the United States where
social media played a critical role in spreading the story across the world. An
explosion of media coverage occurred within just days of the event. The
predicament faced by many community members is that without formal power
behind their cause, any issues they raise may go nowhere. For better or for
worse, the media can bring attention to an issue which brings resources. The
advice of the community asking hard questions is certainly not groundbreaking.
Some would suggest that many groups have been doing this for years with no
results. Regardless of past results, the community should continue to apply
coercive pressure in a way that leads to results.
Community members should consider leveraging the knowledge from
professional organizations. For the national professional organizations, most of
their publications are open source and accessible to anyone. Based on the
regression model and the interviews, these organizations are very influential
and community members could base their arguments for change in the policy
positions of the national professional organizations. Using this tactic may

124

provide more legitimacy to the community’s arguments and bridge the
knowledge gap in subject matter expertise.
My final recommendation originates from the very core of the institutional
theory dimensions. My recommendation is to strengthen the institutions.
Institutional theory is primarily concerned about influence and where it
originates. The mimetic dimension of the theory holds that organizations look to
each other for new ideas and solutions to new and novel problems. One
organization finds a new solution that appears to work and another one adopts
it because there is no clear precedent on how to proceed. The normative
dimension of the theory states that organizations look to accepted practices in a
field to do things. Professional organizations play a key role in this dimension
because they provide information and direction for the norms. They also help
identify and promote leading organizations in the field. This research has
discussed at length the way in which different professional organizations and
accreditation bodies can influence the policies and practices of departments.
The recommendation is for the local departments to form working groups
to systematically mimic and standardize their operations. Rather than using the
natural tendencies of departments to cooperate, the process could be
formalized and include larger departments such as St. Louis County Police
Department. Currently, many of the municipal departments work very well with
others on projects, and this recommendation looks to expand upon that. For
example, several departments worked together to research and purchase body
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cameras. Similar practices should be expanded to other areas of administrative
areas and operations. None of this is to say that departments should or should
not consolidate. The issue of consolidating local governments or police
departments is beyond the scope of this research. These local departments
can keep their independence while working to together to share resources.
The first area where these efforts can be expanded is crime statistics
and tracking. Currently there is little day-to-day or week-to-week tracking of
crime trends and patterns between departments. The lack of macro level crime
tracking at the county level may by surprising, but the fragmented nature of St.
Louis County has historically made this difficult. Individual departments track
crime and crime statistics, and individual detectives work together for cases that
span over many jurisdictions. I am proposing that the departments in St. Louis
County work together to hold bi-weekly or monthly meetings discussing crime
trends and coordinated responses. The practical benefit of this
recommendation is that the situational awareness of crime trends in the county
and region should increase substantially. The second benefit is that a stronger
coordination of effort should result from the meetings. With more knowledge of
crime trends, the limited resources of the collective group of departments can
be leveraged to a greater extent. With more collective knowledge, the leaders
of the respective departments can mobilize working groups of detectives and
officers from different departments to working on the most pressing problems.
The nature of these meetings and groups should foster the transfer of
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techniques and processes while also improving the service to citizens. The
recommended approach is a step toward the integration of services while
maintaining the independence of all departments. Participation in the meetings
and resulting actions should be completely voluntary.
A second area where departments can collaborate to intentionally foster
the spreading of norms and methods of operations is in policy formation.
SLAPCA and CALEA currently play a role in the policy creation process within
St. Louis County. SLAPCA makes recommendations to the members and
fosters conversations about policies. In contrast, CALEA is making
recommendation to accredited departments on the policies to maintain
accreditation. One recommendation would be to have departments participate
in a voluntary working group to create policies for the entire county. The core
tenants of policies would be formed during the working groups. Those tenants
or pillars of the policies would be based on research and best practices. Once
those core tenants are agreed upon, the finer details and application of the
policy can be tailored to each individual department. The essence of the policy
would be the same for each department with only the logistics of each policy
differing by department. Forming policies in this manner would move the
departments toward standardization and unification of policies without
compromising the individual identities of departments. Rather than each
department work independently to create policies, they can rely on another
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department to work exclusively on one policy area and then share results. In
other words, the ability to perform deep research on each topic area increases.
Policies are not effective unless officers understand and follow them. To
provide this support for policies, I am recommending that St. Louis County
Departments voluntarily collaborate on training. The State of Missouri Peace
Officers Standards and Training (POST) Commission mandates the training
required for officers throughout the state. The mandates include requirements
for new officers and the continuing education of officers. CALEA mandates
training annually, bi-annually, and tri-annually in several areas for departments
to maintain accreditation. The implication is that the bulk of the training is
already standardized in some way through the state of CALEA if the department
is accredited. Some of these areas overlap so that training to satisfy one
mandate satisfies another. Within these mandates, room for customization is
available to departments. For example, CALEA mandates annual use of force
training. The precise content of the training is discretionary. The open-ended
nature allows each department to decide what is most important for their needs.
If St. Louis County Departments already share key mandates from the
State of Missouri and CALEA and then start sharing core policies, it would
follow that they could benefit from sharing continuing education training. The
St. Louis County Police Department produces in-service training programs
throughout the year to satisfy these requirements for its officers. As long as the
officers attend the training, they will meet all state requirements to maintain their
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individual POST commission and allow their department to maintain CALEA
accreditation. The same in-service training could be provided to the municipal
departments of St. Louis County. Once again, this would standardize practices
across departments while leveraging the expertise and resources of larger
departments. Smaller department may benefit the most from the
recommendation. For example, rather than doing the training in-house, very
small departments could enroll officers in the St. Louis County training to satisfy
annual training requirements.
The final way departments could standardize the norms of police
departments is to hold quarterly meetings with community stakeholders to hear
direct feedback. For example, every quarter, the chiefs from all St. Louis
County Police Departments could meet with the representatives from the area
community groups such as the NAACP, ADL, Urban League, and similar
groups to discuss current issues. During these meetings, the participants could
discuss issues arising from events in the community or review policies with
feedback from the community groups. The meetings could even be used as a
way to solicit community feedback for policy formation. Back to the theme of
formalizing the mechanisms of institutional theory, these meetings bring
together the practitioners and community groups so that the line of influence is
direct. The chief can hear the perspectives of the community groups directly
and on a regular basis. The byproduct of these meetings would be greater
recognition of issues from both sides and relationship building.
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All of the initiatives discussed within this section rely on voluntary
participation. Undoubtably, some departments will not participate. While not
desirable, the lack of participation can serve as a key indicator to other
departments, elected officials, and community groups as to the professionalism
of departments. The benefit to participating in these working groups as I have
described them is great with little downside other than putting in the work to
implement and execute the policies. The benefits may be greatest to the
smallest departments where the resources to research crime stats and policies
is the least. Smaller departments could take advantage of the larger
departments with virtually no cost.
Limitations of Study
The research has several limitations. Those limitations include the lack
of survey participation, lack of generalizability, and the self-selection bias of
chiefs. I will explain the implications of each one in turn.
Nearly half of all departments within St. Louis County did not respond to
the survey. The survey was promoted for several months with several emails
being sent through the SLAPCA member list and with me personally sending
emails and calling police departments asking for participation in the survey. The
non-responses create a knowledge gap and poses the question of whether
those departments are systematically different from those responding to the
survey. I examined that question and did find evidence that the non-responding
departments are different in terms of size, median income, and accreditation
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status. The lack of participants also impacts the confidence in the regression
coefficients used in the research. While some were statically significant, the
analyses would have had more statistical power to identify effects with greater
participation.
An outgrowth of low participation is the generalizability of the findings.
The small sample limits the extent of the generalizability of the findings. I would
caution applying the findings to other scenarios or departments. Policing in St.
Louis County is unique in many ways. Because of the distinctiveness, it
becomes harder to apply the findings to departments in other localities with a
more unified picture of policing. A key factor when discussing the policing
landscape in St. Louis County is the coordination and relationship between
departments. I would describe the policing in St. Louis County as an
ecosystem where the interconnected organisms are the departments operating
in the local political environment. Look no further than the death of Michael
Brown as an example of how one organism can disrupt the entire ecosystem.
Departments in a more unified and centralized ecosystem of policing do not
face some of the same challenges and therefore the findings from this research
may not be applicable.
The final limitation of this study concerns the interviews of police chiefs.
The chiefs self-selected to be interviewed while completing the survey. They
are certainly outliers in the sense that they were willing to complete the survey
and willing to be interviewed. Because of these factors, I cannot state they
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were an average chief in St. Louis County. In fact, they may be quite different
from their peers in their willingness to share their views. Even if they stand
apart from their peers, their perspectives provided much needed context to the
survey results and offered a view into the mindset of chiefs as they navigate
changes to the environment. The insights provided by those chiefs should
serve as positive examples as to what challenges are endured by those
professionals. The intent was to get the details about the decision-making
process and how pressures from the external environment shape the choices
made. Even if the chiefs interviewed are outliers, their interviews served the
purpose peering into the mechanics of decision making from the top of a police
organization.
I turn now to recommendations for further research. To start with, more
research needs to be done regarding the impact of outside influences on police
reform. This research only looked at one geographic location and did not
examine many of the real-world outcomes for the community such as quality of
life and perceptions of police. Further research could enhance the literature by
looking deeper into the relationship between a chief’s reception to outside
influence and the outcomes for the community. Perhaps premature, but the
speculation would be that chiefs open to outside influence from community
groups may lead to greater citizen satisfaction. The chiefs more open to
outside influence may represent the community’s desires more in political
sense. A chief being too political and serving a small breadth of interests could

132

also lead to dissatisfaction for a police department. A balance of interests with
a strong professional base to mediate the opposing poles is likely the best
approach.
Another item for further research is examining more closely the role of
professional organizations and accreditation programs such as CALEA. Do
these programs make a difference? More specifically, do they make a
difference in the eyes of the community, the union leaders, or the front-line
officers? All of these variables may be inter-related as satisfying one group
may cause some dissatisfaction among another group. More research should
be done on the role accreditation and standing in the community to see how it
impacts the satisfaction with police departments and even officers.
Conclusion
Michael Brown died on August 9, 2014. His death ushered in awareness
to long-standing issues that directly or in-directly influenced changes to policies,
behaviors, and outcomes. Despite the improvements, more work is required to
strengthen policing in St. Louis County. The area needs a greater reliance and
use of professional organizations to bring best practices and modern
philosophies to St. Louis County policing.
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Appendix A: Complete Survey as displayed in Qualtrics
Police Practices in St. Louis County

Start of Block: Intro
Q1.1 The survey you are about to take is to examine policing practices in St.
Louis County. The research will involve historical research on policing
practices, surveys, and interviews of police officials. The goal of the research is
to determine what factors facilitate or inhibit enacting reform measures in police
departments in St. Louis County. Participation in this research is voluntary and
the risk to the participants is extremely low. Please read the following
statements about the research and click the proceed button to consent to all of
the conditions and take the survey.
1. You are invited to participate in a
research study conducted by Ph.D. Candidate, Colby Dolly and Dr. David
Kimball. 2. Your participation will involve completing an online survey about
your department and a possible follow-up interview by the principal researcher,
Colby Dolly. Approximately 50 police departments may be involved in this
research. The amount of time involved will be 20 minutes to complete the
survey and 40 minutes for the interview (if applicable). The surveys will be
completed first to be followed by optional and voluntary interviews at a later
date. The interviews will be held virtually for convivence and
safety. Participants will not be compensated for participating.
3. You will be asked to identify your police department but not your personal
identifying information.
4. There are no known risks associated with this
research other than the potential loss of confidentiality. Any discussion of your
department in the dissertation or other publication will use a pseudonym the
protect the identity of your department.
5. Benefits may include learning
what other departments are doing for reform efforts. 6. Your participation is
voluntary, and you may choose not to participate in this research study or
withdraw your consent at any time. You will NOT be penalized in any way
should you choose not to participate or withdraw.
7. We will do everything
we can to protect your privacy. As part of this effort, your personal identity will
not be revealed in any publication that may result from this study.
8. If you
have any questions or concerns regarding this study, or if any problems arise,
you may call the Investigator, Colby Dolly at 314-309-5171 or email him at
colbydol@gmail.com. You may also ask questions or state concerns regarding
your rights as a research participant to the Office of Research, at 314-5165897.

o Proceed (4)
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Skip To: Q1.2 If The survey you are about to take is to examine policing
practices in St. Louis County. The res... = Proceed

Q1.2 Department Name:
____________________________________________________________
____

Page Break

Q88 The next several sections will ask questions about technology, programs,
and policies that your department has implemented and the year of
implementation.

Q1.3 Technology

Q1.4 Does your department have a body camera program?

o Yes (1)
o Planning on implementing (2)
o No (3)
Display This Question:
Does your department have a body camera program? = Yes

135

Q1.5 In what year was the body camera program implemented?

o 2020 (6)
o 2014 to 2019 (7)
o 2013 or earlier (8)
Page Break

Q1.6 Does your department use social media for community engagement?

o Yes (1)
o Planning on implementing (2)
o No (3)
Display This Question:
Does your department use social media for community engagement? = Yes
Q1.7 In what year did your department begin to use social media for community
engagement?

o 2020 (1)
o 2014 to 2019 (7)
o 2013 or earlier (8)
Page Break
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Q1.8 Does your department post policies and procedures online?

o Yes (1)
o Planning on implementing (2)
o No (3)
Display This Question:
Does your department post policies and procedures online? = Yes
Q1.9 In what year did your department start posting policies and procedures
online?

o 2020 (1)
o 2014 to 2019 (7)
o 2013 or earlier (8)
Page Break

Q1.10 Does your department post crime statistics online?

o Yes (1)
o Planning on implementing (2)
o No (3)
Display This Question:
Does your department post crime statistics online? = Yes
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Q1.11 In what year did your department start posting crime statistics online?

o 2020 (1)
o 2014 to 2019 (7)
o 2013 or earlier (8)
Page Break
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Q1.12 Does your department publish statistics online about use of force
incidents?

o Yes (1)
o Planning on implementing (2)
o No (3)
Display This Question:
Does your department publish statistics online about use of force incidents?
= Yes
Q1.13 In what year did your department start publishing statistics about use of
force online?

o 2020 (1)
o 2014 to 2019 (7)
o 2013 or earlier (8)
Page Break

Q1.14 Training

Q1.15 Is your department mandating procedural justice training for officers ?

o Yes (1)
o Planning on implementing (2)
o No (3)
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Display This Question:
Is your department mandating procedural justice training for officers ? = Yes
Q1.16 In what year did your department start mandating procedural justice
training for officers?

o 2020 (1)
o 2014 to 2019 (7)
o 2013 or earlier (8)
Page Break

Q1.17 Is your department mandating de-escalation training for officers (Does
not include the mandate by the State of Missouri from October 2020)?

o Yes (1)
o Planning on implementing (2)
o No (3)
Display This Question:
Is your department mandating de-escalation training for officers (Does not
include the mandate by... = Yes
Q1.18 In what year was the de-escalation training mandated?

o 2020 (1)
o 2014 to 2019 (7)
o 2013 or earlier (8)
Page Break
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Q1.19 Does your department mandate wellness training for officers?

o Yes (1)
o Planning on implementing (2)
o No (3)
Display This Question:
Does your department mandate wellness training for officers? = Yes
Q1.20 In what year did your department start mandating wellness training for
officers?

o 2020 (1)
o 2014 to 2019 (7)
o 2013 or earlier (8)
Page Break

Q1.21 Programs

Page Break
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Q1.24 Does your department have a program focused on officer-youth
interaction within the community other than D.A.R.E. and S.R.O.s?

o Yes (1)
o Planning on implementing (2)
o No (3)
Display This Question:
Does your department have a program focused on officer-youth interaction
within the community oth... = Yes
Q1.25 In what year did your department start the officer-youth programming?

o 2020 (1)
o 2014 to 2019 (7)
o 2013 or earlier (8)
Page Break

Q1.26 Does your department have an officer wellness program (a program for
ensuring the mental, emotional, and physical health of employees) with at least
one dedicated employee to run the program ?

o Yes (1)
o Planning on implementing (2)
o No (3)
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Display This Question:
Does your department have an officer wellness program (a program for
ensuring the mental, emotion... = Yes
Q1.27 In what year was the officer wellness program started?

o 2020 (1)
o 2014 to 2019 (7)
o 2013 or earlier (8)
Page Break

Q1.28 Does your department have programs to provide alternatives to arrest or
other diversion programs (e.g., C.I.T)?

o Yes (1)
o Planning in implementing (2)
o No (3)
Display This Question:
Does your department have programs to provide alternatives to arrest or
other diversion programs... = Yes
Q1.29 In what year did your department begin to provide alternatives to arrest?

o 2020 (1)
o 2014 to 2019 (7)
o 2013 or earlier (8)
Page Break
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Q1.30 Policies

Q1.31 Does your department have search and seizure procedures related to
L.G.B.T.Q. and transgender citizens?

o Yes (1)
o Planning on implementing (2)
o No (3)
Display This Question:
Does your department have search and seizure procedures related to
L.G.B.T.Q. and transgender cit... = Yes
Q1.32 In what year were the search and seizure procedures enacted?

o 2020 (1)
o 2014 to 2019 (7)
o 2013 or earlier (8)
Page Break
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Q1.33 Does your department have a citizen advisory board for input on policies
and oversight? For example, a board specifically to advise on community
relations, but not for oversight of complaints.

o Yes (1)
o Planning on implementing (2)
o No (3)
Display This Question:
Does your department have a citizen advisory board for input on policies
and oversight? For examp... = Yes
Q1.34 In what year was the citizen oversight board created?

o 2020 (1)
o 2014 to 2019 (7)
o 2013 or earlier (8)
Page Break

Q1.35 Does your department have a civilian review board? For example, a
board that is responsible for reviewing complaints on officers and the discipline
of department employees.

o Yes (1)
o Planning in implementing (2)
o No (3)
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Display This Question:
Does your department have a civilian review board? For example, a board
that is responsible for r... = Yes
Q1.36 In what year was the civilian review board established?

o 2020 (1)
o 2014 to 2019 (7)
o 2013 or earlier (8)
Page Break

Q1.37 Does your department have policies, procedures, or formal plan to recruit
more applicants that are representative of the community in terms of race,
ethnicity, or gender?

o Yes (1)
o Planning on implementing (2)
o No (3)
Display This Question:
Does your department have policies, procedures, or formal plan to recruit
more applicants that ar... = Yes
Q1.38 In what year did your department begin to have policies to recruit more
applicants that are representative of the community?

o 2020 (1)
o 2014 to 2019 (7)
o 2013 or earlier (8)
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Page Break

Q1.39 Does your department participate in a national database tracking use of
force (e.g., F.B.I., Center for Policing Equity)?

o Yes (1)
o Planning in implementing (2)
o No (3)
Display This Question:
Does your department participate in a national database tracking use of
force (e.g., F.B.I., Cent... = Yes
Q1.40 In what year did your department start to participate in a national
database?

o 2020 (1)
o 2014 to 2019 (7)
o 2013 or earlier (8)
Page Break

Q1.41 Does your department report a display of a firearm as a use of force?

o Yes (1)
o Planning on implementing (2)
o No (3)
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Display This Question:
Does your department report a display of a firearm as a use of force? = Yes
Q1.42 In what year did your department start reporting a display of a firearm as
a use of force?

o 2020 (1)
o 2014 to 2019 (7)
o 2013 or earlier (8)
Page Break

Q1.43 Does your department collect data on pedestrian stops other than
regular call for service information? For example, collecting the perceived race
and age of a citizen and whether a search was conducted.

o Yes (1)
o Planning on implementing (2)
o No (3)
Display This Question:
Does your department collect data on pedestrian stops other than regular
call for service informa... = Yes
Q1.44 In what year did your department start collecting data on pedestrian
stops?

o 2020 (1)
o 2014 to 2019 (7)
o 2013 or earlier (8)
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Page Break

Q1.45 Does your department have an early warning system to detect patterns
of misconduct or problematic behavior in officers?

o Yes (1)
o Planning on implementing (2)
o No (3)
Display This Question:
Does your department have an early warning system to detect patterns of
misconduct or problematic... = Yes
Q1.46 In what year did your department start using an early warning system?

o 2020 (1)
o 2014 to 2019 (7)
o 2013 or earlier (8)
Page Break

Q1.47 Does your department require written waivers for all consent searches?

o Yes (1)
o Planning on implementing (2)
o No (3)
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Display This Question:
Does your department require written waivers for all consent searches? =
Yes
Q1.48 In what year did your department start to require written waivers for all
consent searches?

o 2020 (1)
o 2014 to 2019 (7)
o 2013 or earlier (8)
Page Break

Q1.49 Does your department prohibit the use of misdemeanor wanteds (e.g.,
entering an arrest teletype based on only an officer’s authority)?

o Yes (1)
o Planning on implementing (2)
o No (3)
Display This Question:
Does your department prohibit the use of misdemeanor wanteds (e.g.,
entering an arrest teletype b... = Yes
Q1.50 In what year did your department start prohibiting misdemeanor
wanteds?

o 2020 (1)
o 2014 to 2019 (7)
o 2013 or earlier (8)
150

Page Break
End of Block: Intro
Start of Block: Influences
Q89 The next section of the survey will ask you to evaluate a series of
statements regarding your police department and other groups and
organizations.

Q2.1 My department looks to other nearby police departments for best
practices.

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department looks to
other nearby police departments for best practices."
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Q2.2 My department looks to other organizations (businesses, schools, nonprofits) for best practices.

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department looks to
other organizations (businesses, schools, non-profits) for best practices."

Q2.3 My department has specific organizations to use for best practices (e.g.,
specific police departments used to guide policies and operations).

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department has
specific organizations to use for best practices (e.g., specific police departments
used to guide policies and operations)."
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Q2.4 My department encourages attendance at local professional association
meetings (S.L.A.P.C.A., F.B.I. NA, etc.).

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department
encourages attendance at local professional association meetings
(S.L.A.P.C.A., F.B.I. NA, etc.). "

Q2.5 My department encourages employees to obtain leadership roles within
the local professional associations.

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Page Break
Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department
encourages employees to obtain leadership roles within the local professional
associations."
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Q2.6 My department is influenced by the Commission on the Accreditation of
Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA).

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department is
influenced by the Commission on the Accreditation of Law Enforcement
Agencies (CALEA)."

Q2.7 My department is influenced by the Missouri Police Chiefs’ Association.

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department is
influenced by the Missouri Police Chiefs’ Association."
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Q2.8 My department sends employees to the Senior Management Institute of
Policing (S.M.I.P.) training.

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department sends
employees to the Senior Management Institute of Policing (S.M.I.P.) training."

Q2.9 My department sends employees to the F.B.I. National Academy training.

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department sends
employees to the F.B.I. National Academy training."
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Q2.10 My department sends employees to the Northwestern Police Command
School.

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Page Break
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Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department sends
employees to the Northwestern Police Command School."

Q2.11 My department is influenced by the National Organization of Black Law
Enforcement Professionals (NOBLE).

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department is
influenced by the National Organization of Black Law Enforcement
Professionals (NOBLE)."

Q2.12 My department is influenced by the Police Executive Research Forum
(PERF).

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department is
influenced by the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF)."
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Q2.13 My department regularly applies for grants from external sources.

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department regularly
applies for grants from external sources."

Q2.14 My department is influenced by local elected officials to enact police
reform.

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department is
influenced by local elected officials to enact police reform."
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Q2.15 My department is influenced by local community groups such as
churches, schools, and non-profit organizations to enact police reform.

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Page Break
Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department is
influenced by local community groups such as churches, schools, and nonprofit organizations to enact police reform. "

Q2.16 My department is influenced by local businesses to enact police reform.

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
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Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department is
influenced by local businesses to enact police reform."

Q2.17 My department is influenced by state or national elected officials to enact
police reform.

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department is
influenced by state or national elected officials to enact police reform."

Q2.18 My department is influenced by local elected officials/city officials to
enforce traffic laws.

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
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Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department is
influenced by local elected officials/city officials to enforce traffic laws."

Q2.19 My department is influenced by one or more labor organizations to
strengthen officer rights and discretion.

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department is
influenced by one or more labor organizations to strengthen officer rights and
discretion. "

Q2.20 My department is influenced by officers to promote pro-enforcement
practices.

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
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Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "My department is
influenced by officers to promote pro-enforcement practices."

Q2.21 Officers in my department are influenced a labor organization.

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
End of Block: Influences
Start of Block: Wrap-up
Q90 The next section of the survey will ask questions related to protests and
reform.

Carry Forward All Choices - Displayed & Hidden from "Officers in my
department are influenced a labor organization."

Q3.1 A great deal of police reform is needed in St. Louis County.

o Strongly disagree (1)
o Disagree (2)
o Neither agree nor disagree (3)
o Agree (4)
o Strongly agree (5)
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Q3.2 What, if any, specific reforms are needed for policing in St. Louis County?
____________________________________________________________
____
____________________________________________________________
____
____________________________________________________________
____
____________________________________________________________
____
____________________________________________________________
____

Q3.3 Do you believe that the protests have been effective in stimulating reform?
____________________________________________________________
____
____________________________________________________________
____
____________________________________________________________
____
____________________________________________________________
____
____________________________________________________________
____

Q3.4 What do you feel are the biggest impediments to reform?
____________________________________________________________
____
____________________________________________________________
____
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____________________________________________________________
____
____________________________________________________________
____
____________________________________________________________
____

Q3.5 Are you willing to be interviewed about your responses and the topic of
police reform? Your answers will be confidential. If yes, please provide your
contact information.
____________________________________________________________
____
____________________________________________________________
____
____________________________________________________________
____
____________________________________________________________
____
____________________________________________________________
____
End of Block: Wrap-up
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Appendix B: Regression Diagnostics
Plots of GVLMA checks
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Testing for Linearity
To test for linearity, I created a series of scatter plots that showed the
relationship between the variables. No obvious pattern of non-linearity existed.
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Testing for Normality
To test for normality, I created a histogram of the residuals and examined the
shape of the distribution. The distribution appears to be normal.

Testing for Influential Observations
Testing for influential observations was done with the Bonferroni test. The
results of the test found no studentized residuals with a p-value less than 0.05
meaning that there were no influential observations.
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Testing for Homoscedasticity
To test for homoscedasticity, I ran the non-constant error variance test and the
Breusch-Pagan test. The result of the non-constant error variance test was not
significantly significant (p-value = 0.13) meaning that the model meets the
assumption of homoscedasticity. The Breusch-Pagan test provided the same
non-significant result (p-value = 0.11) indicating homoscedasticity.
Testing for Multicollinearity
Testing for multicollinearity was done using the variance inflation factor test.
The convention is that if a value for a predictor exceeds five, a collinearity
problem may exist. The values for each independent and control variable are
shown below.
Normative

Mimetic

Coercive

1.43

1.69

1.54
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Violent
Crime
Rate
2.42

Total
Officers

Median
Income

1.16

3.28
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